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Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law
Michelle A. Travis*
The little boy went first day of school
He got some crayons and started to draw
He put colors all over the paper
For colors was what he saw
And the teacher said, What you doin 'young man
I'm paintin 'flowers he said
She said, It's not the time for art young man
And anyway flowers are green and red...
But the little boy said
There are so many colors in the rainbow
So many colors in the morning sun
So many colors in the flower and I see every one
Well the teacher said, You're sassy
There's ways that things should be
And you 'll paint flowers the way they are
So repeat after me...
Flowers are red young man
Green leaves are green
There's no need to see flowers any other way
Than the way they always have been seen'
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I. Introduction
When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the
ADA),2 lawmakers envisioned a tool that would redesign the conventional
workplace. The ADA not only prohibits most private employers from acting on
invidious animus, but also requires employers to actively modify the workplace
to accommodate individuals with disabilities.3 According to the ADA's
primary sponsor, the statute represents the "twentieth century Emancipation
Proclamation for all persons with disabilities."4 The United States Supreme
Court provided a similarly reconstructionist vision of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)5 when the Court endorsed the disparate impact
theory, which requires employers to replace facially neutral practices that
disproportionately affect protected groups.6 The Court recognized that
chapin/flowers-are-red.html (last modified 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 (5)(A), 12111(9), 12112(a)-(b) (2000) (defining "employer"
and "reasonable accommodation" and providing a multi-part definition of the general
antidiscrimination rule).
4. 136 CONG. REC. S 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-1 7 (2000)).
6. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (197 1) (invalidating an employer's
requirement of a high school diploma or passing of intelligence and aptitude tests as a condition
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eliminating employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin would require more than just preventing employers from
prejudiced decisionmaking. Achieving workplace equality also would require
employers to remove all "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers," and to
eliminate the "built-in headwinds" of the conventional work environment.
Because both Title VII's disparate impact theory and the ADA's
accommodation mandate were intended to displace established social norms,
both statutes properly are characterized as "transformative law."9
Initially, advocates were very optimistic that the ADA and Title VII would
help restructure the workplace to provide meaningful access and new
employment opportunities.'° As many scholars have explained, however, this
hope has gone significantly unrealized." The inability of these laws to
of employment because the requirements disproportionately excluded black applicants).
7. See id. at 429-32 (finding that Congress intended to achieve equal employment
opportunities by directing "the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation").
8. See id. at 431-32 (setting forth Title VII's requirements). When Congress amended
Title VII in 1991 to codify the disparate impact model explicitly, Congress directed courts to
interpret the statute in accord with Griggs. See Civil Rights Act of 199 1, Pub. L. No. 10 1-1 66,
§ 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (199 1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note) (requiring that Congress
"codify the concepts.., enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. .. ");
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)(codified at42 U.S.C. § 1981 note)
(restricting the statements that can be relied upon as legislative history in construing or applying
the Act); Interpretative Memorandum, 137 CONG. REc. 28,680 (1991) (commenting on the
terms "business necessity" and "job related"); 137 CONG. REc. 28,878 (1991) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (declaring one of the 1991 Amendment's purposes to be codification of Griggs).
9. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 476, 479 (2000) (defining the term "transformative" law).
10. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1989) (noting that the broad vision ofdisparate impact in
Griggs "encouraged advocates to pursue and to eradicate a variety of more subtle, and often
more intransigent, forms of discrimination"); Krieger, supra note 9, at 495 (noting that when
Griggs endorsed the disparate impact theory, the Court "seemed poised to displace a broad
range of employment-related institutions"); Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and
Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing the Determination of"Disability" Undermines the ADA,
42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 329 (1997) (describing the "transformative effect" that ADA supporters
"optimistically anticipated in 1990").
11. See, e.g., RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY
POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 163 (2001) (calling the ADA's effects in the workplace "profoundly
disappointing"); Rachel Amow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of
Work/Family Initiatives in a "Me, Inc." World, 12 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 345,363 (2003) (noting
that "[a]s applied, the ADA has not effectuated wide-scale changes in the structure of
employment"); Krieger, supra note 9, at 495 (explaining that the initial optimism about Title
VII's disparate impact theory has waned as courts have been "sharply circumscribing its
transformative effect"); Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and
Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
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fundamentally restructure the workplace is particularly evident with respect to
traditional methods of organizing the when, where, and how of work
performance, including the default preferences for full-time positions, unlimited
hours, rigid work schedules, an uninterrupted worklife, and performance of
work at a central location. This bundle of related default organizational
structures-referred to collectively as the "full-time face-time norm"-
frequently excludes individuals from the workplace, particularly individuals
with disabilities and women with significant caregiving responsibilities.
Unfortunately, neither the ADA nor Title VII has done much to transform this
exclusionary norm.
One of the reasons for this disappointing result is that judges have
interpreted the ADA and Title VII through the lens of "workplace
essentialism." For either the ADA or Title VII to restructure the workplace
successfully, judges first must envision an alternative. To do so, judges must
be able-and willing-to parse out the malleable ways that job tasks are
organized from the actual tasks that comprise the essence of the job itself.
Judges repeatedly have demonstrated an inability--or simply an
unwillingness-to take this step. Instead, judges have assumed that jobs are
defined at least in part by the default organizational structures that make up the
full-time face-time norm, thereby placing those structures beyond the reach of
antidiscrimination law and undermining the law's transformative potential.
Although this type of workplace essentialism plays a different doctrinal role in
ADA accommodation cases and Title VII disparate impact cases, the analytic
error is similar in both contexts. Just as the teacher in Harry Chapin's song
refused to acknowledge the little boy's suggestion that flowers are still flowers
even if painted in many different colors, so judges have refused to acknowledge
that a job is still a job even with many different designs for when, where, and
how the tasks are performed.
Judicial interpretation of the ADA and Title VII through the lens of
workplace essentialism is an example of what Professor Linda Hamilton
Krieger has described as "capture through construal.' 2 Capture occurs when
entrenched norms affect judges' statutory construction in ways that constrain
the law's full implementation. 3 These entrenched norms operate as "taken-for-
granted background rules," which "systematically skew the interpretations of
transformative legal rules so that those rules increasingly come to resemble the
LAB. L. 315, 318 (1998) (explaining that "courts at all levels have balked at the invitation to
unleash fully the power of disparate impact" when applying Title VII to the workplace).
12. Krieger, supra note 9, at 486.
13. See id. (defining "capture through construal").
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normative and institutional systems they were intended to displace."' 4 In other
words, the danger is not only that the entrenched norm of the essentialized
workplace is undermining judges' ability to interpret the ADA and Title VII to
realize these laws' full transformative potential. The further risk is that these
judicial interpretations are, in turn, relegitimating and reifying the very same
default workplace structures that the laws were designed to subvert.
Because the ADA and Title VII have fallen short of initial expectations,
some scholars have moved away from antidiscrimination law as a primary tool
for achieving workplace equality.' 5 Others have continued to suggest future
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the
Limitations ofDiscrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 79, 154 (1989) (arguing that the "primary focus" for those seeking to restructure the
workplace should be "to acknowledge the limited reach of discrimination analysis, articulate
that limit, and move on in search of a broader framework"); Julie Novkov, A Deconstructing of
(M)otherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 155,
185 (1991/1992) (arguing that "Title VII is not a universal solution" to reconstructing the
workplace); see also Joan Williams, Market Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44
VILL. L. REV. 305,305 (1999) (describing the "accepted wisdom" that "discrimination law offers
few weapons" to restructure the workplace); cf Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability
Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 6, 55 (2004) (arguing that "[a]ntidiscrimination laws are not suited to
eliminating deep-rooted structural barriers to employment" and that disability advocates should
move to "a social welfare approach"); Francine J. Lipman, Enabling Work for People with
Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REv.
393,402, 440-43 (2003) (proposing a revised accommodation tax provision to create incentives
to hire disabled workers); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disabiilty
Accommodations, 53 DuKE L.J. 79, 176-77 (2003) (explaining that "the point at which
accommodating people with disabilities is no longer reasonable, but still socially beneficial, is
an appropriate departure point from which to consider state-funded employment opportunities
through the payment of subsidies to employers"); Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical
Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1183 n. 173
(2004) (listing scholars who have proposed the use of government subsidies in lieu of the
ADA's accommodation mandate).
The strongest criticisms of antidiscrimination law have been about its inability to address
structural discrimination and to alter workplace norms. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Cross-
Dressing in the Master's Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 758 (2000) (expressing doubt that
employment discrimination law "will actually alter the dominant norms of most workplaces or
the kinds of roles that men and women play within them"); Dowd, supra, at 80-82 (arguing that
employment discrimination law "is a very partial, limited means" for changing workplace norms
because it "fails to reach structural discrimination or mandate structural reform"); Mary Joe
Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.
L. REv. 55, 94 (1979) (arguing that Title VII will not restructure the labor market dramatically
because Title VII "favor[s] the status quo"); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1325-26 (1987) (arguing that Title VII's disparate impact
theory "does not allow for challenges to male bias in the structure of business, occupations, or
jobs"); Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-
Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1456
(concluding that employment discrimination law is a "poor tool" for changing workplace
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roles for employment discrimination law, 16 while recognizing that no tool can
be the single answer to such a multifaceted problem.' 7 This Article joins the
latter group by identifying a common analytic error in both ADA and Title VII
case law and articulating an interpretation that would allow individuals with
disabilities and women with caregiving responsibilities to recapture some of the
untapped transformative potential of employment discrimination law. Part II
begins by exploring the phenomenon of workplace essentialism and
hypothesizing on its origins and the reasons for its remarkable resilience. Part
III reveals the specific doctrinal method by which workplace essentialism has
undermined the ADA's and Title VII's ability to redesign default workplace
structures. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the ways in which the use of
workplace essentialism in judicial interpretation is at odds with the statutory
norms).
16. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT To Do ABouT IT 104-10 (2000) (explaining how employment discrimination law
could be used to provide nonmarginalized flexible work arrangements); Amow-Richman, supra
note 11, at 398-400 (urging activists to "continue the project of using existing discrimination
laws" as one tool for restructuring the workplace); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 92-93, 111-56 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Workplace Dynamics]
(conceptualizing discrimination in workplace dynamics and proposing a role for
antidiscrimination law's disparate treatment theory); Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace
Context: Title VIIas a Toolfor Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 659,690-723,724
(2003) [hereinafter Green, Workplace Context] (arguing that Title VII "holds the capacity to
trigger change in the organizational structures, cultures, and taken-for-granted institutionalized
practices that continue to engender unequal treatment in the workplace" and explaining how
class actions with public safeguards could help realize this capacity); Katherine V.W. Stone,
The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 519,609-14 (2001) (proposing new dispute resolution
procedures to make employment discrimination law more effective in the modem work
environment); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMp. &
LAB. L. 283, 318-73 (2003) [hereinafter Travis, The. Virtual Workplace] (explaining how
antidiscrimination law could be used to require employers to provide equitable telecommuting
options); Michelle A. Travis, Telecommuting: The Escher Stairway of Work/Family Conflict,
55 ME. L. REV. 261, 282-86 (2003) [hereinafter Travis, Telecommuting] (explaining why
employment discrimination law may be a valuable tool for preventing telecommuting from
entrenching the gendered workplace hierarchy); Williams, supra note 15, at 327-36 (explaining
how Title VII's disparate treatment theory could protect mothers and how the disparate impact
theory could challenge workplace structures built around male norms).
17. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 10, at 1196-97,1215-16 (advocating antidiscrimination
litigation as one of many approaches for transforming workplace norms); Vicki Schultz, Life's
Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1885 (2000) (arguing that "employment discrimination law
alone will not get us where we need to go"); Smith, supra note 15, at 1447 (concluding that "no
singular approach" can restructure the workplace); Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note
16, at 319, 375-76 (explaining that the "multifaceted problem" of workplace inequality requires
a "multifaceted response").
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language, legislative purposes, and interpretive regulations. This analysis
highlights the fact that, unlike the teacher's response to the little boy's creative
flower painting, there is indeed a need to see jobs in ways other than "the way
they always have been seen."
II. Workplace Essentialism
Essentialism is a belief in the true essence of something: "that which is
most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of' that particular
thing. 8  To "essentialize" something is to assume that all examples of that
particular thing share the same inherent, invariable, and defining
characteristics.' 9 In discrimination discourse, scholars most frequently have
used the concept of essentialism to critique the construction of gender, race,
and sexual orientation when assumptions are made that all members of a
particular group possess inherent common characteristics or a shared
experience. 20 The individuals who are subject to discrimination, however, are
18. DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE 2 (1989);
see Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics ofJuvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 936 (1995) (defining essentialism as "the belief that a type of
person or thing has a true, intrinsic, and invariant nature... that is constant over time and
across cultures and that consequently defines and constitutes it").
19. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETr & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09 (2d ed. 1998) (setting forth seven different meanings of
"essentialism"); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 78 (2d ed.
2003) (defining "essentialism" in relation to gender); Stephanie M. Wildman, Ending Male
Privilege: Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1797, 1811 (2000) (defining
"essentialism"); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of
Essentialism, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 855 (1999) (noting essentialism's use of "false
universalism").
20. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of
Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43, 43-44 (1994) (noting that "theorists who use the
categorical term 'lesbian"' may fall into an essentialist trap by assuming that the lesbian
experience is "monolithic"); Nancy E. Dowd, Resisting Essentialism and Hierarchy: A Critique
of Work/Family Strategies for Women Lawyers, 16 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 185, 187-90
(2000) (revealing how work/family scholarship essentializes the experiences of white, middle-
class women and married, heterosexual families as the shared experience); Trina Grillo, Anti-
Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools To Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995) ("Essentialism is the notion that there is a single woman's, or Black
person's, or any other group's, experience that can be described independently from other
aspects of the person .... "); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (defining "gender essentialism" as "the notion that a unitary,
'essential' woman's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class,
sexual orientation, and other realities of experience"); Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy:
Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836
(1993) (explaining that an essentialist view of sexual orientation is "the beliefthat gayness is an
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not the only subjects of essentializing rhetoric. Objects, ideas, institutions, and
concepts can be essentialized as well.2' In the context of employment
discrimination, this means that an essentialism critique can be levied not just
against the construction of categories of marginalized workers, but also against
the construction of the workplace itself.
Today's essentialized workplace is built around the "full-time face-time
norm," which assumes that the invariable properties defining the "whatness 
" 22
of a good job include full-time work with very long hours or unlimited
overtime, rigid work schedules for core work hours, uninterrupted worklife
performance (with severe consequences for time off during crucial, "up-or-out"
phases of career development), and performance at a central location.23 These
default workplace structures characterize not only the best professional,
executive, and other white-collar jobs, but also the most desirable blue-collar
work. 24  What essentializing rhetoric has done to this full-time face-time
concept is to shift it from being merely descriptive to being both normative and
definitional. In other words, full-time face-time has become not just the way
that successful companies currently are designed, but also the way that they
should and must be designed. This essentialist view, like all essentialist
outlooks, assumes that the current structure is constant, as well as ahistorical,
asocial, and apolitical-all of which are inaccurate.25
intrinsic property," and that all who experience same-sex desire can be treated as a "single
group" with stable traits); Roberts, supra note 19, at 855 (analyzing whether a BlackCrit theory
is essentialist by "erroneously imply[ing] that Blacks share a common, essential identity"); Jane
Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate in Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate
and Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 274-75 (1999) (describing essentialism in
feminist debates).
21. See Ainsworth, supra note 18, at 936 (explaining that essentialism can apply to a
"thing" as well as to a "type of person"); Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood
Market?: A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (2003)
(recognizing "the possibility of essentializing ideas (as opposed to the more common discussion
of essentializing groups of people)"); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 858 (1999) (applying the concept of essentialism to the
legal construction of constitutional rights).
22. See Fuss, supra note 18, at xi (defining essentialism as "a belief in the real, true
essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 'whatness' of a given
entity").
23. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 1, 5,71-72,76,79-81 (describing the ideal worker
norm that defines today's best jobs); see also Abrams, supra note 10, at 1223-24, 1227
(describing how the best jobs are designed to require "[h]erculean time commitments,"
"stringent limits on absenteeism," and a "protracted evaluation period (often six to ten years)
that precedes promotion decisions").
24. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 1, 5, 71-72, 76, 79-81 (describing the common
characteristics of the best blue-collar and white-collar jobs).
25. See Grillo, supra note 20, at 19 (explaining that an essentialist outlook "assumes that
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In reality, the entrenchment and legitimacy of the essentialized workplace
originated with the historic shift in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries from a system of patriarchy to what Professor Joan Williams
characterizes as a system of "domesticity."2 6 During that period, the growing
commercial and industrial economy began to force a separation of "work" from
"home," both geographically and temporally.2 7  That shift required the
development of a new social order from the prior era when work and home
were intertwined in space and time, and when both work and home were
governed by explicit patriarchal power and hierarchy.28
The new social order of domesticity reflected more egalitarian
Enlightenment ideals.29 Domesticity no longer described women as "inferior,"
but simply as "different," which allowed adult work to become bifurcated into
two distinct and ostensibly equal spheres: the home, which was the women's
sphere, and the market, which was the men's sphere. 30 Although domesticity
was a step forward from the prior patriarchal regime, the result was that the new
workplace was designed around that particular social order.3' Specifically,
market work was structured around workers who had no household or
caregiving responsibilities and who received a free flow of domestic work.32
These so-called "ideal workers" could provide a full-time uninterrupted stream
of market work, which was the model upon which the new workplace was
built.33 Of course, those most likely to possess "ideal worker" status were and
remain able-bodied men. Because of the shifting expectations of the
domesticity model, able-bodied men began to link their sense of self to
successful market work, rather than to religious, political, and social roles, as
the experience of being a member of the group... is a stable one," with a meaning that is
"constant through time, space, and different historical, social, political, and personal contexts");
Ortiz, supra note 20, at 1836 (explaining that an essentialist view of sexual orientation sees
"gayness" as stable across time, history, and social context).
26. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 20-25 (discussing the concept and development of
domesticity).
27. See id. at 31 (noting that there was a shift towards moving market work into factories
and towards a set "workday"); Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 293-94
(explaining that "the Industrial Revolution ... was responsible for moving the workplace out of
the home").
28. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 20-25, 31 (describing the development of
domesticity over the last two centuries).
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 23-24 (stating that "[d]omesticity gendered not only personality and
emotional expressiveness but also market work").
32. Id.at2,24,71.
33. Id.
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previously had been the case.34 These shared expectations led to established
behavior patterns that eventually became institutionalized norms.35
The institutionalization of the ideal worker model and the full-time face-
time norm has shown remarkable resilience over time despite significant
countervailing forces. The default organizational structures have changed very
little despite the influx of women and individuals with disabilities into the labor
force. These structures also have remained intact despite the dramatic increase
in single-parent and dual-earner families that do not possess ideal worker
status. 36  And perhaps most surprisingly, these structures have continued
despite growing empirical evidence of their negative economic consequences.
Data shows that providing flexible work schedules, job sharing, and reduced
hour options not only improves recruiting but also reduces absenteeism and
turnover, which saves significant rehiring and retraining costs. 37 Additionally,
flexible work arrangements can increase worker productivity. 38 Researchers
have found similar results with telecommuting, which also can reduce
employers' overhead and other fixed costs. 39 The resilience of the full-time
face-time workplace despite all of these contrary forces is testimony to the
power of essentialized rhetoric. All forms of essentialism, by their very nature,
help restrict the possibility of reorganization and change, even when change
could produce real economic gains.4°
The failure to challenge the inherent nature of existing work structures
likely is facilitated by a number of different phenomena. Of course, those who
possess significant labor market power may have an incentive to essentialize
the existing workplace to help reduce competition for limited advancement
41opportunities and to perpetuate their privileged status. Workplace
34. Id. at 25.
35. Id.
36. See Jane Waldfogel, Family-Friendly Policiesfor Families with Young Children, 5
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMp. PoL'Y J. 273, 275-76 (2001) (summarizing data on the rise in single-
parent and dual-earner families).
37. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 88-91.
38. See id. at 65, 88, 91-93 (describing the effect of flexible work policies on worker
productivity).
39. See Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 364-67 (listing the economic
benefits of telecommuting).
40. See Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essentialism, in THE
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 84 (Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed eds., 1994) (defining "essentialism"
in a feminist context).
41. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 28-29 (describing a study revealing widespread
resistance of blue-collar workers to "the invasion of unqualified women into their turf," which
was based on anxiety over decreasing hourly wages and an inability to be a successful sole
breadwinner); Better on Balance?: The Corporate Counsel Work/Life Report 35 (Dec. 2003)
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essentialism may be perpetuated, however, through many other less conscious
ways as well.
Studies show that many men link their sense of self so strongly to work
success that they no longer recognize the ideal worker role as a "choice,"
regardless of how exploitative work becomes.42 Additionally, most successful
managers continue to possess the privileges that allow them to perform as ideal
workers, so the conflict between work and domestic responsibilities, and the
implicit demand for an able-bodied stature, are simply invisible to those in the
best position to alter the organization of work.43 Most top business managers
still have homemaker wives who attend to all domestic responsibilities, and the
most successful working men are those most likely to adhere to the
"housewife/breadwinner model" upon which the ideal worker norm and its
related workplace structures so heavily depend.44 Not surprisingly, supervisors
who are married to homemakers provide less job-related flexibility than
supervisors who have spouses employed in market work.
4
Another contributing factor to the invisibility of existing workplace
structures is what social psychologists refer to as the "fundamental attribution
error."46  The fundamental attribution error is the well-documented
phenomenon that occurs when observers try to determine the cause of another's
behavior. In making these causal attributions, observers systematically
overestimate the role of the other person's internal, dispositional characteristics,
and they underestimate the power that the situation has in controlling the other
person's conduct.47
[hereinafter Work/Life Report] (explaining how "macho attitudes" and "competition for limited
advancement" can help create a culture that rejects part-time work arrangements), available at
http://www.pardc.org/Publications/BetterOnBalance.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
42. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 30, 60 (noting men's dissatisfaction with the ideal
worker norm).
43. See id. at 27, 74-75 (noting one study finding that successful men took on limited
household responsibilities); see also Work/Life Report, supra note 41, at 35 (explaining that one
thing that helps "create a culture that rejects or undermines part-time policies" is "management
that is not itself in a position ofjuggling the demands faced by a two-income earner family").
44. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 27, 74-75.
45. Id. at 74.
46. Cf Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent
Mistakes", 55 VAND. L. REv. 481, 519-25 (2002) [hereinafter Travis, Perceived Disabilities]
(using the fundamental attribution error to help explain why employers overestimate employee
impairments and misperceive nondisabled employees as disabled, rather than focusing on the
limiting aspects of workplace design).
47. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 198-200
(Leonard Berowitz ed., 1977) (describing the fundamental attribution error). The seminal study
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In one typical experiment demonstrating the fundamental attribution error,
researchers asked subjects to observe two actors participate in a general
knowledge "quiz game. ' 48 The subjects watched a researcher randomly assign
one actor the role of "questioner" and one actor the role of "contestant." 49 The
subjects knew that the researcher instructed the questioner to write ten difficult
and esoteric questions that would display the questioner's own unique
expertise. 5° The subjects then watched the questioner pose the ten questions to
the contestant, who inevitably performed poorly because the game conferred an
extraordinary role advantage on the questioner. 51 At the end of the game, the
researcher asked the observers to rate the questioner's and the contestant's
general knowledge, and the observers consistently ignored the powerful
situational constraints. 52 The observers attributed the game's outcome to
characteristics of the actors and, therefore, rated the questioner as vastly more
knowledgeable than the contestant.53 What the observers failed to recognize
was that the questioners "did not possess any superiority in general
knowledge-they merely had exploited the opportunity to choose the particular
topics and specific items that most favorably displayed their general
knowledge.
5 4
on the fundamental attribution error was in 1967. See MILES HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION:
FROM COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO COLLECTIVE BELIEFS 50-51 (1989) (noting that the experiment
is "generally used as an illustration" of the fundamental attribution error); RICHARD NISBETT &
LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 121
(1980) (calling the experiment a "demonstration of people's overwillingness to ascribe behavior
to enduring dispositions"). In that study, experimenters asked subjects to read a student exam
answer in a political science course. Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of
Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1,4 (1967). The experimenters told some subjects
that the exam question asked the student to defend Fidel Catro's Cuba, and the experimenters
told some subjects that the exam question asked the student to choose whether to write a defense
or a criticism. Id. The experimenters then asked the subjects to predict the student's true
attitudes. Id. Even in the former scenario in which the answer was dictated solely by the
situation-by the exam question-the subjects attributed the essay to the student's personal
beliefs. Id. at 5-7.
48. See Lee D. Ross et al., Social Roles, Social Control and Biases in Social-Perception
Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 485,485,490-91 (1977) (describing the "quiz
game" experiment).
49. Id. at 485-87.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 485-88,490-9 1. Of course, the questioner also would have performed poorly if
placed in the disadvantaged contestant role. See id. at 485-88 (noting that the quiz was
"designed to confer a self-preservation advantage upon questioners relative to contestants").
52. Id. at 491.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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When employment decisionmakers observe employees who lack ideal
worker status struggle to succeed in the existing workplace, the fundamental
attribution error predicts that the decisionmakers will attribute such failure to
internal characteristics of the workers rather than to the situational constraints
of a workplace that is organized around the full-time face-time norm. One
reason for this attribution bias is perceptual. 5 People simplify their cognitive
processing by focusing on stimuli that are the most salient or attention-
grabbing.5 6 Salience often leads to the perception of causality, even if the most
salient stimuli are not the most causally influential.5 7 When observers attribute
a cause for another person's behavior, that person typically is more salient than
the environment in which the person is behaving, which leads to trait
attributions instead of situational ones.58 When an employment decisionmaker
tries to decide why women or individuals with disabilities are not succeeding in
the workplace, the workplace itself simply fades into the background.
Social science research indicates that the fundamental attribution error is
particularly likely to occur in the employment setting. 59 The tendency to
55. See NISBETr& Ross, supra note 47, at 123-25 (explaining that observers usually pay
more attention to people than to background situational factors, which leads to dispositional
attributions).
56. See HEWSTONE, supra note 47, at 52-53 (noting that observers are more likely to
focus on other people than on the situation); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (1995) (discussing distinctiveness-based distortions
in a person's perception and judgment); Leslie Zebrowitz McAurthur, What Grabs You?: The
Role of Attention in Impression Formation and Causal Attribution, in I SOcIAL COGNriON 201,
201-03 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981) (asserting that "salient, though trivial, stimuli often
exert a strong influence upon our attentional focus"); John B. Pryor & Mitchell Kriss, The
Cognitive Dynamics of Salience in the Attribution Process, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
49, 53 (1977) (noting that salience is a "stimulus quality that attracts an observer's attention");
Shelly E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head
Phenomena, in 1 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOcIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 259-64 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1978) (discussing the role of salience in behavioral attribution).
57. See HEWSTONE, supra note 47, at 52-53 (posing a possible explanation for the
fundamental attribution error); McAurthur, supra note 56, at 201-06 (discussing how salient
stimuli are perceived); Taylor & Fiske, supra note 56, at 264-65 (discussing salience and
perception).
58. See HEWSTONE, supra note 47, at 152 (noting that on "the intra-personal level ... the
actor's behavior is often more salient than the situation"); NISBETT & Ross, supra note 47, at
122-25 (providing experimental evidence); Pryor & Kriss, supra note 56, at 53-54 (asserting
that a "tendency to see persons as disproportionately causal in relation to their environment may
be related to the prominence of persons... in memory").
59. See Ross et al., supra note 48, at 494 (noting that differentiated social roles, such as
employer-employee roles, can bias interpersonal judgments); see also Travis, Perceived
Disabilities, supra note 46, at 524 (explaining that high differentiation in roles between
employers and employees creates a situation particularly prone to the fundamental attribution
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overattribute another person's behavior to that person's internal characteristics
rather than to situational constraints is heightened when the observer views the
person as a member of a different group, when the person's performance can be
characterized as a failure,60 or when the person's conduct has consequences for
the observer.6' All of those elements exist in the typical employment
decisionmaking context where a member of the management group is
evaluating a member of the employee group because of an employee's
performance problem. Because observers disproportionately attribute out-
group members' failures to internal characteristics of those individuals, rather
than to situational constraints, it is not surprising that the existing workplace
structure remains unquestioned and unchanged.
The tendency to overattribute an employee's poor performance to a
shortcoming of the employee, rather than to a shortcoming in workplace design,
likely is exacerbated by the challenges that managers face in assessing
performance in the first place. In many new jobs in the information and service
economy, productivity is difficult to assess. As a result, face-time often
becomes a convenient proxy for productivity and performance quality.62 Social
psychologists have documented the cognitive biases that contribute to this
equation of talent with face-time. 63 The risk that face-time will become a
productivity proxy is highest in companies that lack a formal performance
evaluation system or do not conduct regular employee reviews, or in companies
where employee evaluations are heavily dependent on "politics," "perceptions,"
and "popularity. "64 When managers equate the inability to put in face-time with
low productivity and then attribute that perceived low productivity to individual
error).
60. See Krieger, supra note 56, at 1191-92 (citing relevant studies).
61. See John S. Carroll & John W. Payne, The Psychology of the Parole Decision
Process: A Joint Application of Attribution Theory and Information-Processing Psychology, in
COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 20 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976)
(discussing relevant studies).
62. See Workl/Life Report, supra note 41, at 43 (focusing on the stigma of part-time work
in in-house counsel jobs). In a recent workplace study, one employee reported a typical
supervisor's response to her request to work part-time and be judged on the results of her work,
rather than on face-time. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 73 (describing the details of the
study). The supervisor responded: "I don't know how to do part-time. My experience is that
people who put in the hours are the ones who succeed .... What matters is how much time you
put into the job .... That's all I know how to understand as a basis for getting ahead." Id.
63. See Joan C. Williams, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the Law, 70
FoRDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2236 (2002) (citing work by Professor Lotte Bailyn of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
64. See Work/Life Report, supra note 41, at 36, 43 (noting this risk in particular for in-
house counsel jobs).
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employee shortcomings, the essentialized workplace gets perpetuated in the
process.
The social science theory of cognitive dissonance reduction may facilitate
the perpetuation of the essentialized workplace as well. "Cognitive dissonance"
refers to the uncomfortable feeling that arises when one acts in a way that is at
odds with one's beliefs or knowledge. 65 Researchers have demonstrated that
people will go to great lengths-both consciously and unconsciously-to
reduce such cognitive dissonance by modifying one's beliefs or knowledge,
even at the expense of rational judgment.6 In other words, belief systems often
follow behavior, rather than the other way around.
One situation in which cognitive dissonance can occur is when a person
changes roles, such as when a factory worker gets promoted to foreperson.67
The behavior required in the new role, including giving orders instead of
receiving them, may be at odds with opinions and values that the individual
held as a low-level worker.68 The resulting cognitive dissonance generally
results in the individual's opinions coming in line with the values of other
supervisors. 69 In more general terms, workers who do what it takes to move up
in the existing workplace hierarchy predictably tend to become more committed
to the values embraced by those in the upper hierarchy of the existing structure
as a way to reduce any dissonance that their new position may produce.
Another situation that can create cognitive dissonance is when a person
completes a course of conduct that does not end up being worth the sacrifice
and perseverance that the conduct required. 70  As one social scientist has
explained, "[o]ne does not work hard for nothing," so when one finds that the
result of hard work is something less desirable than anticipated, cognitive
65. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-3 (1957).
66. See id. at 3 (hypothesizing that people are motivated to selectively avoid information
that will increase cognitive dissonance); Elliot Aronson, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance:
A Current Perspective, in 4 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1,3-5 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1969) (describing experiments in which people rationalize their behavior to
reduce cognitive dissonance); Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social
Psychological Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 636, 637 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (referencing dissonance research
exploring "the barriers to rational judgment" that are created by prior commitment to
controversial beliefs).
67. FESTINGER, supra note 65, at 272-73.
68. Id. at 273.
69. Id.
70. See Pronin et al., supra note 66, at 637 (giving the example of"Vietnam War veterans
who were injured or held in POW camps and draft resisters who left the country or went to jail
for their actions [and must now] either continue to disagree... or else pay a heavy psychic
price").
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dissonance will occur.71 Individuals who succeed in the full-time face-time
workplace may find themselves in this situation, if such success required them
to sacrifice health, sleep, or time for family, leisure, or other social endeavors.
One way to reduce the resulting dissonance is simply to distort one's view
of the result in a more favorable direction.72 Another strategy is to seek social
support from people who are in the same dissonance-producing situation.73
People in the same situation may help convince each other that negative aspects
of the situation are in fact very important and even pleasurable. This process
may explain workplace cultures in which successful workers wear their extreme
work hours as a badge of honor and actually "prize[] the ability to work long
hours at the expense of all else.
7 4
Another form of dissonance reduction that occurs once a person has
committed to a dissonance-producing course of action is that the person tends
to seek out information that will decrease the dissonance and, more importantly,
to avoid information that would increase it.75 In particular, the person seeks out
information indicating that the course of action was wise and correct, and the
person avoids information to the contrary. If the person is exposed
involuntarily to such contrary information, the person often ignores,
misinterprets, or discredits the information in order to preserve the perceived
validity of his or her prior conduct.7 6 This process may explain why data
revealing the economic benefits of flexible work arrangements have not
produced significant changes by presumably economically efficient employers.
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that individual decisionmakers who have
succeeded under the conditions of the full-time face-time workplace will tend to
become more committed to the existing structure. Social scientists believe that
71. See Aronson, supra note 66, at 4, 10-12 (describing how cognitive dissonance can
result from effort); see also JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, ExPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE 29-30 (1962) (describing how cognitive dissonance may result by expending effort
or experiencing negative consequences from a committed course of conduct).
72. See Aronson, supra note 66, at 4, 10-12 (describing studies showing that people who
had to exert significant unpleasant effort to gain admission to a group that turned out to be
uninteresting reported the most favorable perceptions of the group to reduce the cognitive
dissonance produced by their efforts).
73. FESTINGER, supra note 65, at 192-96; see Aronson, supra note 66, at 3 (describing
various methods for a smoker to decrease the cognitive dissonance that results from continuing
to smoke while knowing that smoking causes cancer, including "associat[ing] with other
cigarette smokers").
74. See Work/Life Report, supra note 4 1, at 22 (focusing on in-house legal departments
and also describing law firm cultures in which attorneys proudly boast about their billable
hours).
75. FESTINGER, supra note 65, at 3, 123-31.
76. Id. at 131-36.
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it is more accurate to assume a group of "rationalizing," rather than objectively
rational, decisionmakers.1
7
A recent workplace study provides an illustration of this phenomenon.
The study recorded a senior manager's reaction to a junior manager who
reported a survey showing that employees wanted a more balanced worklife.
7s
The senior manager responded:
Don't ever bring up "balance" again! ... Everyone in this company has to
work hard. We work hard. They have to work hard. That's the way it is.
Just because a few women are concerned about balance doesn't mean we
change the rules. If they choose this career, they're going to have to pay for
it in hours, like the rest of US.
79
By the tone of the senior manager's response, it appears that his history of ideal
worker status and having "to pay" for his career in hours created cognitive
dissonance when the value of long work hours was questioned. The manager
appeared to reduce that dissonance by becoming rigidly committed to the
existing workplace structure, despite its negative aspects, and by seeking social
support for that structure from other managers-that is, "we"-who were in the
same dissonance-producing situation. The result was to justify and ultimately
essentialize the existing workplace as simply "the way it is."
Cognitive dissonance represents one strand of a broader phenomenon that
social psychologists call "system justification," which refers to the general
motive that people have to justify the existing social order.80 System
justification theory analyzes and documents the "social and psychological needs
to imbue the status quo with legitimacy and to see it as good, fair, natural,
desirable, and even inevitable."' 1 This theory would predict that various
cognitive biases not only may allow the essentialized workplace to perpetuate,
but also may help further legitimate and retrench it.
Although researchers have studied system justification theory primarily in
the context of large-scale political and economic systems, similar processes may
77. Aronson, supra note 66, at 3; see also Pronin et al., supra note 66, at 637 (explaining
that social psychologists have "showed unparalleled ingenuity in demonstrating the ways in
which people rationalize their actions and reduce discrepancies in their belief systems").
78. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 73-74 (citing ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME
BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 71 (1997)).
79. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 74 (quoting HOCHSCHLD, supra note 78, at. 71).
80. See John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo 1 (2004) (providing an
overview of system justification theory) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Pronin et al., supra note 66, at 637 (noting the large body of
social psychological research demonstrating "the human capacity for rationalization").
81. Jost et al., supra note 80, at 9.
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be affecting the justification of the work environment. Researchers believe that
people have developed a general capacity to internalize and rationalize their
socially constructed environments, particularly environmental features that are
very difficult to change.8 2 This tendency is so strong that it often occurs even at
the expense of one's individual or group interests.8 3 Even those people who the
status quo excludes or devalues are biased toward naturalizing the status quo's
existence, rather than engaging in strategies for change.8 4 For example, one
study found that low-income subjects were more likely than high-income
subjects to agree that large pay differentials were "necessary" to provide "an
incentive for individual effort." 85 Another study found that workers in low-
paying jobs had adjusted their expectations in line with the status quo and
believed that their work on difficult tasks was worth less than workers in high-
paying jobs. 6 Other studies have documented this depressed sense of
entitlement among members of other disadvantaged groups, such as women
accepting conventional definitions of sex roles and often feeling that they
deserve lower wages than men. 7
In the context of the essentialized workplace, evidence suggests that even
those most likely to be excluded, including women with caregiving
responsibilities and individuals with disabilities, may have internalized the
status quo. For example, studies show that most women do not question their
husbands' right to perform as ideal workers, and most provide "unquestioned
support for men's careers. 8 In a long-term study of the autobiographies of
individuals with disabilities, researchers similarly have documented instances in
which employers' discriminatory conduct is "simply accept[ed] as natural.
8 9
Both advantaged and disadvantaged workers seem to have accepted the
existing workplace design and the notion that employers are entitled to a
workforce of ideal workers who can meet the full-time face-time norm.9°
82. See id. at 39 (summarizing the similar findings of several published works).
83. See id. at 4, 33 (providing examples of against-interest behaviors in disadvantaged
classes).
84. See id. at 12-36 (analyzing why members of low status groups favor the status quo
even though they are disadvantaged by it).
85. Id. at 35.
86. Id. at 30.
87. Id. at 29, 33.
88. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 30.
89. • DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN
THE LIFE STOIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 11 (2003).
90. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 20 (discussing employees' perceptions of employer
entitlement).
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Although all of this evidence explains why employers have been, and
likely will continue to be, resistant to voluntarily restructuring the workplace,
the phenomenon of workplace essentialism exists against the backdrop of
affirmative mandates in employment discrimination law. When Congress
enacted the ADA's accommodation model and the Supreme Court first
recognized Title VII's disparate impact theory, the potential for combating
workplace essentialism and redesigning exclusionary workplace norms became
a reality. Realizing that transformative potential, however, requires judges to
be able and willing to resist the gravitational force exerted by the status quo that
so effectively keeps employers tethered to the full-time face-time norm.
Unfortunately, judges have not been immune to the status quo's pull. As Part
HI will demonstrate, workplace essentialism not only has affected employment
decisionmakers, but also has captured judges' interpretation of employment
discrimination law.
II1. The Capture of Employment Discrimination Law's
Transformative Potential
This Part describes the particular doctrinal methods by which workplace
essentialism captures the law's transformative potential in both ADA
accommodation claims and in Title VII sex-based disparate impact claims. In
both contexts, the plaintiff must state a prima facie case of discrimination, and
then the employer may affirmatively defend its conduct. When that conduct
involves the decision to organize the workplace around the full-time face-time
norm, judges frequently have used workplace essentialism to defeat the
plaintiffs claim before it reaches the affirmative defense stage. As a result,
employers are shielded from ever having to provide a business justification for
exclusionary workplace norms, and the conventional workplace design is
placed beyond the reach of antidiscrimination review. Although workplace
essentialism has infiltrated judicial interpretation through different doctrinal
paths in ADA and Title VII cases, the following discussion will demonstrate
that the underlying analytic errors are analogous.
A. Defining "Essential Job Functions" Under the ADA
To state an ADA claim, the plaintiff must prove that he or she is disabled
and can perform the "essential functions" of the job "with or without a
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reasonable accommodation."9' The plaintiff is then deemed a "qualified
individual," who is within the ADA's protected class and for whom the
employer is required to redesign workplace policies, practices, equipment, and
procedures.92 Employers may refuse such accommodations by invoking the
affirmative defense of "undue hardship,"9 3 which requires the employer to
prove that the accommodation imposes "significant difficulty or expense" in
94
light of the company's operations and financial resources.
When an employer's default organizational structures exclude individuals
with disabilities from the workplace, courts have two possible approaches to
interpreting the ADA's accommodation mandate: a transformative approach
that would require employers to restructure the existing workplace design or an
essentialist approach that treats the existing design as immutable and beyond
the ADA's reach. Under either approach, judges must begin by determining
whether an individual is entitled to an ADA accommodation, which requires
judges to assess whether the individual can perform the job's "essential
functions." This is because disabled individuals who require modification of an
essential job function are not considered "qualified individuals" and are
therefore outside of the ADA's protected class. Identifying a job's "essential
functions" is the point at which the two possible approaches first diverge.
Under the transformative approach, judges would identify ajob's required
tasks and distinguish them from the malleable organization of when, where, and
how the tasks get performed. In other words, judges would recognize that job
"functions" do not include the bundle of conditions imposed by the full-time
face-time norm, but only include the underlying tasks that the worker is
required to accomplish. Under this approach, an employer would be required
to restructure any aspect of the full-time face-time norm that excludes a
disabled individual from workplace participation. The individual's need to
change the exclusionary default structure would be characterized as a proper
accommodation request-a request for a workplace modification that would
allow the employee to perform the actual essential functions of the job-which
91. The statute prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a disability,"
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000), which is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position." Id. § 12111(8).
92. See id. §§ 12111(8), 12111(9), 12112(a), 12112(b) (defining "qualified individual"
and "reasonable accommodation" and construing "discrimination" to include the failure to
reasonably accommodate qualified disabled workers).
93. See id. § 1211 2(b)(5)(A) (providing an exception to the reasonable accommodation
obligation).
94. See id. § 12111 (10) (defining "undue hardship" and listing factors to consider in
assessing this defense).
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would render the employee a "qualified individual" who is covered by the
ADA. If modifying the default structure had any negative impact on the
employer, which often it would not, judges would analyze that impact under the
employer's undue hardship defense. That would force employers to
demonstrate a business justification in order to resist workplace restructuring
and to retain an exclusionary workplace norm.
As Part IV will demonstrate, this transformative approach has significant
support in the ADA's statutory language, legislative intent, and interpretive
regulations. Nevertheless, only a few courts have interpreted the ADA to
advance its transformative goals.95 In the same way that workplace essentialism
has allowed employers to retain the full-time face-time norm despite significant
countervailing social and economic forces, workplace essentialism has allowed
most courts to ignore the ADA's transformative potential, thereby further
retrenching the workplace status quo.
The majority ofjudges who have interpreted the ADA through the lens of
workplace essentialism diverge from the transformative approach by failing to
distinguish actual job tasks from the default organizational norms regarding
when, where, and how the actual tasks get performed. These judges assume
that jobs are defined by their existing default structures, including the full-time
face-time norm, and they therefore equate the traditional ways of organizing
work performance with the underlying work tasks themselves. Based on this
assumption, these judges characterize default workplace structures as "essential
job functions," which places these exclusionary norms beyond the reach of
antidiscrimination law. If an individual with a disability needs to modify
something that is characterized as an "essential job function," the worker does
not meet the ADA's definition of a "qualified individual." Accordingly,
whenever an employee's disability precludes performance under the full-time
face-time norm, that employee falls outside of the ADA's protected class, and
courts can dismiss the employee's accommodation claim for failure to state a
prima facie case. Employers, in turn, are never required to defend their
exclusionary default structures by demonstrating that a modification or
alternative would create an undue hardship. As a result, the essentialized
workplace not only remains intact regardless of business need, but the courts
themselves are relegitimating the existing workplace in the process.
Courts have made this error in accommodation claims challenging the
entire array of structures that make up the full-time face-time norm. The
95. See infra notes 272-86 and accompanying text (discussing the "ultimately inadequate"
steps that some courts have made towards achieving the ADA's transformative goals).
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Seventh Circuit illustrated this approach in DeVito v. Chicago Park District
9 6
when it affirmed a verdict for the employer on Nicholas DeVito's ADA claim.
97
The employer fired DeVito from an office receptionist position after DeVito
requested a long-term, part-time schedule to accommodate a back injury.98 The
Seventh Circuit began by noting correctly that the ADA "provides relief only to
persons who are capable, with or without an accommodation,... to perform the
essential functions of their job."99  The court, however, did not analyze
DeVito's ability to perform a receptionist's required job functions, such as
taking messages and answering questions. Instead, the court characterized the
default organization of those functions into a single, full-time position as itself
an essential function of the job.' °
Because DeVito could not perform the "essential function" of working
full-time, the court held that he was unqualified and "therefore was not within
the Act's protections."''0 By defining DeVito out of the ADA's protected
class, the court allowed the employer to retain its exclusionary default structure
without ever having to demonstrate that dividing the receptionist job into
several part-time positions would cause an undue hardship. Moreover, by
characterizing the employer's preference for full-time schedules as an "essential
job function," rather than as one particular way to organize when and how the
actual job functions get done, the Seventh Circuit effectively shielded all full-
time job requirements from ADA review.
This shield has protected a wide range of jobs from legal scrutiny,
including positions for which there is no business need for a full-time job
design. In Terrell v. USAir,02 for example, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for an employer that fired Peggy Terrell because her carpal
tunnel syndrome made her unable to work for more than four hours per day.'0 3
Terrell alleged that she could perform all of the actual job duties of a
96. DeVito v. Chi. Park Dist., 270 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.).
97. Id. at 534.
98. Id. The employer fired DeVito after only temporarily allowing him to work part-time.
Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. (holding that the ability of disabled individuals to perform the essential job
functions "in the case of a full-time job requires that they be capable of working full-time"); see
also Caroselli v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 596, 600 (N.D. I1. 2004)
(citing DeVito and holding that "[a] full-time schedule can be an essential job function").
101. DeVito, 270 F.3d at 534; see also Caroselli, 15 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 599-
600 (holding that a plaintiff with fibromayalgia failed to establish a prima facie ADA case
because her inability to work full-time rendered her unqualified for a channel manager position).
102. Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 1998).
103. Id. at 623.
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reservations sales agent, and she argued that any impact on the employer from
having to split her position into two part-time positions rather than one full-time
position should be assessed under the undue hardship defense. 104 The employer
could not prove undue hardship, given that the employer had, without
difficulty, provided part-time work for the plaintiff in the past and for other
workers after the plaintiff's termination. 105 Nevertheless, the court treated the
employer's full-time default structure as itself an essential function, rendering
the plaintiff unqualified and unprotected by the ADA.
0 6
As the hour expectations for many jobs increase, the legal protection of
default hour requirements is likely to have an increasingly exclusionary effect.
One data point is provided by Davis v. Microsoft Corp. ,17 in which Thomas
Davis challenged a default sixty to eighty hour workweek for systems
engineers. 'O Davis alleged that the employer failed to accommodate his
hepatitis C infection by refusing to allow him to work a forty hour workweek
with eight hour days.'0 9 The Washington Supreme Court set aside a jury
verdict for Davis and dismissed his accommodation claim." 0 The court
shielded the company's workweek requirement from legal scrutiny by broadly
defining the "essential functions of the job." The court held that "[t]he term
'functions' (or 'job duties') cannot be construed simply as 'tasks,"' nor can the
phrase "essential functions" refer only to "the tasks and activities that are
indispensable to the job.""' Instead, the court construed "essential job
functions" to encompass all types of "'conduct' and 'service' required of the
employee," including being able to work sixty to eighty hours per week." 2
By defining the employer's default scheduling requirement as an "essential
job function," rather than as one particular way to organize when and how the
104. See id. at 624-27 (summarizing the plaintiff's argument that part-time work is a per se
reasonable accommodation and that the burden shifts to the employer to show undue hardship).
105. See id. (finding that part-time positions existed temporarily prior to the plaintiff's
leave and that the plaintiff and others were later recalled for part-time positions).
106. See id. at 625-26 (holding that USAir was not required to create a part-time position
for the plaintiff because none existed at the time).
107. Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 70 P.3d 126 (Wash. 2003).
108. See id. at 128-31 (describing the job's unstructured schedule that allegedly required
sixty to eighty hours. of work per week). Davis sued under the Washington Law Against
Discrimination (WLAD). Id. at 128. However, the WLAD's accommodation requirement is
similar to the ADA's, and the court relied on ADA case law to decide Davis's WLAD claim. Id.
at 128, 132-34.
109. Id. at 128-29.
110. Id. at 133.
11. Id. at 132 (citations omitted).
112. Id. (citations omitted).
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actual job functions are performed, the court removed Davis from the law's
protected class. Davis's inability to perform an essential job function rendered
him unqualified and therefore unable to state a prima facie case." 3 As a result,
Microsoft never had to demonstrate whether modifying the sixty to eighty hour
workweek for some systems engineers-perhaps by dividing some of the
positions into several part-time positions-would create an undue hardship.
Although unique customer demands or functional engineering requirements
indeed may make it impossible for any systems engineer to have a regularly
scheduled, forty hour workweek, the court could have required Microsoft to prove
that fact under the undue hardship defense in order to retain an hour requirement
that excludes a disabled individual. 14 Instead, the court effectively insulated all
exclusionary full-time job structures from legal review."'
113. Id. at 133-34; see also Amow-Richman, supra note 11, at 364 (using Davis to
illustrate how "courts have accepted the existing structure of work as a baseline in delineating
the extent of accommodation required under the ADA").
114. The court did note that systems engineers "worked a varying number of hours per day
due to unpredictable customer demands, that frequent out-of-state travel was necessary to serve
their customers and advance the company's selling objectives, and that consequently they
worked on average well more than 40 hours per week." Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 70 P.3d 126,
133 (Wash. 2003). However, the court never decided whether changing the resulting
workweeks of some engineers would impose an undue hardship. Such scrutiny became
unnecessary after the court decided to treat the long workweek as an "essential function" that the
plaintiff had to be able to perform in order to state a prima facie case, rather than limiting the
prima facie inquiry solely to Davis's ability to perform the discrete, underlying job tasks. It is
one thing for the court to note that all prior systems engineers had worked long and
unpredictable workweeks in response to customer demands and quite another for Microsoft to
bear the burden of proving that restructuring some of the systems engineering positions-for
example, by hiring multiple part-time engineers-would impose an undue hardship. Cf Amow-
Richman, supra note 11, at 364-66 (criticizing Davis because the court "in no way considered
the wisdom of the employer's work expectation or considered the norms that underlie an eighty-
hour work week, a requirement that would systematically exclude employees with any number
of disabilities").
115. Other cases have taken the same approach. See, e.g., Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 Fed.
Appx. 49, 50-53, 56-57 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (holding that "[a]n employee who cannot
meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a 'qualified'
individual protected by the ADA" and affirming summary judgment for the employer that
denied an account development specialist's request for a part-time schedule to accommodate his
depression); Pickens v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 776-79 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming
judgment for the employer on the employee's ADA claim because his disability interfered with
the essential function of "regular, reliable attendance" and "full-time" work); Browning v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1045-48 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing an ADA claim by a
data entry clerk who requested a four hour workday to accommodate her cubital tunnel
syndrome, and holding that she was not a qualified individual because "she made no showing
that the essential functions of her full-time job could be performed in four hours"); Querry v.
Messar, 14 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting the employer summary
judgment on an ADA claim by a police officer who requested four hour shifts to accommodate a
back condition, and holding that she was not qualified "because she could not perform one of
RECAPTURING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Davis v. Florida
Power & Light Co." 6 Marvin Davis had a back injury that limited his ability to
perform electrical work more than eight hours a day."' Davis asked for an
accommodation from the employer's mandatory overtime policy, by allowing
him either to work a regular schedule without overtime or to volunteer for
overtime when his back condition would permit it."8 The court could have
assessed Davis's ability to perform the tasks involved in reconnecting
customers' electrical power service and then assessed whether deviating from
the mandatory overtime rule would impose an undue hardship on the company.
Instead, the court assumed that mandatory overtime was itself an essential job
function-rather than a malleable policy for determining when and how the
actual job functions get performed-based largely on the employer's assertion
that all employees had been working substantial overtime.1" 9 Having
characterized mandatory overtime as an essential function, the court was able to
characterize Davis as unqualified and beyond the ADA's reach, thereby
justifying summary judgment for the employer. 12  Because the court never
reached the undue hardship defense, the employer never had to explain why
splitting the job into several positions with different hour requirements, or
having others volunteer for additional overtime, would not have served the
employer's interests just as well.
The same issue also has arisen in ADA cases involving accommodation
requests to telecommute or work from home. These cases challenge the default
the essential functions of her job--regularly attending work"); Burnett v. W. Res., Inc., 929 F.
Supp. 1349, 1356-59 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that organizing meter reader jobs into full-time
shifts was an essential function and that the plaintiff was therefore unqualified because his knee
injury made him unable to work more than four hour shifts, which justified summaryjudgment
for the employer).
116. Davis v. Fla. Power& Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (1 Ith Cir. 2000) (finding




119. Id. at 1305-06.
120. See id. at 1302, 1305-06 (finding that the plaintiff's requested accommodations were
unreasonable as a matter of law); see also Sanders v. FirstEnergy Corp., 813 N.E.2d 932, 933
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that overtime is an essential function of a power plant attendant's
job, and affirming summary judgment for an employer that fired the plaintiff because his sleep
apnea made him unable to work overtime); Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. CIV.
A. 94-9606, 1996 WL 131948, at *1, *3-8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996) (granting summary
judgment to an employer that fired a plaintiff from a general manager position after seeking a
forty hour workweek on the day shift to accommodate his clinical depression, and holding that
the plaintiff was not qualified under the ADA because working at least a fifty hour workweek
and one night a week were essential job functions).
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assumption that work must be performed at a central work location. The
Seventh Circuit embraced this default work structure in Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Department ofAdministration.12 ' Lori Vande Zande was partially
paralyzed, which caused her to develop pressure ulcers that periodically made it
impossible to come to the office. 122 To accommodate her disability, Vande
Zande asked for a desktop computer to work full time at home without losing
accumulated sick leave. 123 The employer refused and docked her sick leave
hours.' 24 The Seventh Circuit sided with the employer and affirmed the
dismissal of Vande Zande's accommodation claim.
2 5
To assess Vande Zande's accommodation claim, the court could have
begun by identifying the actual job tasks of a program assistant, including
"preparing public information materials, planning meetings, interpreting
regulations, typing, mailing, filing, and copying.'0 2 6 The court then could have
determined whether Vande Zande would be able to perform those functions
with the proposed accommodation of working at home with a desktop
computer. Instead, the court relied on unsupported assumptions about the
importance of the default full-time face-time requirement. "Most jobs,"
assumed the court, "involve team work under supervision rather than solitary
unsupervised work, and team work under supervision generally cannot be
performed at home without a substantial reduction in the quality of the
employee's performance."'27 Although this assumption is at odds with
significant data showing that telecommuting typically increases employee
productivity and that employers underestimate the number of telecommutable
jobs, 28 the court nevertheless indicated that working on-site was itself an
essential job function, rather than one particular way to organize where
employees perform the actual functions of their jobs. 1
29
121. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,544 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the ADA did not require the employer to allow the plaintiff to work at home).
122. Id. at 543.
123. Id. at 544.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 545.
126. Id. at 544.
127. Id. at 544-45.
128. See Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 364-65 (collecting data
demonstrating the possible productivity gains and underuse of telecommuting).
129. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543-45 (7th Cir. 1995)
(assuming that "productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced" by telecommuting). The
district court made the same mistake in Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555
(N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1171 (1Ith Cir. 1996), by dismissing the plaintiff's ADA claim
asking to work from home to accommodate a multiple chemical sensitivity. Whillock, 926 F.
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Although the Vande Zande court left room for the "extraordinary case" in
which on-site work performance would not be essential, the court established a
general presumption that "an employer is not required to accommodate a
disability by allowing the disabled worker to work, by himself, without
supervision, at home.' 30 By treating on-site work performance as a presumed
essential function of most jobs, the court relieved employers of having to
demonstrate when and how telecommuting would impose an undue hardship on
the company. Of course, some jobs really are location-dependent, such as
construction work or janitorial positions, but employers easily would be able to
demonstrate that telecommuting would create an undue hardship in those
situations. '3' The problem is that the court's characterization of on-site work as
Supp. at 1557-61, 1567. The court held that on-site work was an essential function of a sales
agent's job, based on the employer's unsupported assertions that "in-person interaction is
necessary," that "[s]upervisors could not properly monitor and evaluate the performance of an
off-site sales agent," and that "[t]eamwork, or even work requiring supervision, cannot be
performed at home without a substantial reduction in the quality and productivity of the
employee's performance." Id. at 1564. Although these assumptions are belied by empirical
data, the court simply assumed that employers "have the right to define the essential functions of
a job." Id. at 1563; see also Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 364-65
(collecting data showing that telecommuting may increase productivity).
130. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544.
131. The Seventh Circuit's later opinion in Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson
Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000), is one example of a location-specific job where the
court's similar dismissal may have been the right outcome, but for the wrong reason. Dan
Jovanovic argued that his employer violated the ADA by failing to accommodate his need for
periodic absences from his job as a tool and die maker because of asthma and "Barrett's
esophagus." Id. at 895. To determine if Jovanovic was a "qualified individual" who could
perform the "essential functions" of his job, the court could have focused on the specific tool
and die tasks that were required, which Jovanovic could perform whenever he was at the plant.
See id. at 895 n. I (noting that Jovanovic's medical conditions "in no way impaired his ability to
perform tool and die work when he was present" at work). The court then could have assessed
whether accommodating his need for periodic absences would have created an undue hardship.
If the requested accommodation was to work from home, the court likely would have found an
undue hardship and ruled for the employer because Jovanovic's maintenance and production
tasks only could be done in the factory. Id. at 900. The court did rule for the employer, but on
more problematic grounds. The court treated the employer's default hour and attendance
requirements as themselves essential functions. See id. at 899-900 (stating that "[c]ommon
sense dictates that regular attendance is usually an essential function in most every employment
setting," particularly in "factory positions"). Because Jovanovic could not meet these
requirements, the court deemed him "unqualified" and outside of the ADA's protected class. Id.
at 895, 899-900.
Even though dismissing Jovanovic's case might have been warranted under the undue
hardship defense, other employers now can use the court's holding that "attendance is an
essential function" to remove disabled individuals from the ADA's protected class, even for
location-independent jobs, when the employer would suffer no hardship by allowing employees
to work from home. Moreover, even inJovanovic, the court's dismissal was correct only if the
requested accommodation was to telecommute. If Jovanovic had sought a part-time schedule to
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an implied essential function means that the inquiry will never reach the undue
hardship stage. The court's holding shields the on-site work requirements of
virtually all employers--even for location-independent jobs-by rendering the
plaintiffs "unqualified" and therefore outside of the ADA's protected class. 1
32
Vande Zande's characterization of full-time face-time as a presumed
essential function is already undermining the transformative potential of the
ADA, as many district courts are relying on Vande Zande to dismiss
accommodation claims. One typical case is Wojciechowski v. Emergency
Technical Services Corp. 133 Julie Wojciechowski claimed that her employer
violated the ADA by denying her request to perform her sales representative
job from home to accommodate her cancer.' 34 The employer argued that she
"was not a qualified individual as she was unable to perform an essential
function of her position, being present at the office on a full-time basis."' 35
Wojciechowski urged the court to focus on a sales representative's actual core
work tasks, which may have been technologically portable. 36 Instead, the court
adopted Vande Zande's unsupported assumption that "'productivity inevitably
would be greatly reduced"' whenever an employee works from home.
137
accommodate his disability, the employer may not have been able to prove that dividing up a
tool and die maker position into two part-time jobs would impose an undue hardship. However,
because the court characterized Jovanovic as "unqualified," the employer never had to consider
alternative accommodations or defend its default structure.
132. See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119-25 (10th Cir.
2004) (affirming summary judgment for the employer on a service coordinator's ADA claim
asking to work at home to accommodate her post-traumatic stress disorder); Rauen v. U.S.
Tobacco Mfg. Ltd. P'ship, 319 F.3d 891, 892-97 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming surnmaryjudgment
for the employer on a software engineer's ADA claim requesting a home office to accommodate
her cancer); Spielman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 33 Fed. Appx. 439, 440-44 (10th
Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (affirming summaryjudgment for the employer on a nurse consultant's
ADA claim asking to perform some work from home to accommodate her scleroderma);
Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 54-58 (Ist Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for the
employer on a claims adjuster's ADA claim asking to work at home to accommodate his partial
paralysis); Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1557-61 (dismissing a reservations sales agent's request to
work from home to accommodate her multiple chemical sensitivity); see also Misek-Falkoffv.
IBM Corp. 854 F. Supp. 215, 226-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing plaintiffs Rehabilitation
Act claim alleging that the employer had a duty to accommodate a nervous system disorder by
allowing her to work at home), aff'd, 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111 (1995).
133. Wojciechowski v. Emergency Technical Servs. Corp., No. 95 C 3076, 1997 WL
164004 (N.D. III. March 27, 1997).
134. Id. at*l.
135. Id. at *2.
136. See id. at *2-3 (suggesting that the primary job tasks could be accomplished from
home with a computer that was compatible with the employer's computer and that marginal
tasks such as backup phone duties could be shifted to other workers).
137. Id. at *3 (quoting Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,545 (7th Cir.
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Therefore, the court accepted the employer's characterization of on-site work as
an essential function of the job. 3  As a result, the court defined
Wojciechowski out of the ADA's protected class. Although she allegedly
could perform the primary tasks of a sales representative at home, the court
deemed her "unqualified" and granted the employer summaryjudgment.' 39 The
employer was allowed to retain its exclusionary on-site work requirement
without ever demonstrating that telecommuting would pose an undue hardship
on the company-a showing that the employer may not have been able to make
with Woj ciechowski's potentially location-independent job.
Many other courts have dismissed similar accommodation claims on pre-
trial motions. Whenever the employee's disability makes it difficult for the
employee to meet a default hour or attendance requirement, courts give nearly
talismatic effect to the phrase "attendance is an essential function," even when
the employee can perform all of the underlying jobs tasks.' 40 This allows courts
to characterize employees as unqualified, which avoids the need to assess
whether the employers' rules about office presence are really necessary.' 4' By
1995)).
138. See Wojciechowski, 1997 WL 164004, at *3-4 (noting that the plaintiff did not
"present any evidence that her position was one of the uncommon positions wherein attendance
is not essential").
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 211, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1994)
(affirming summary judgment for the employer on an ADA claim by a medical instructor whose
lupus created attendance problems, even though she could perform her teaching tasks well,
because attendance was an essential function that rendered her unqualified for ADA protection);
Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-80 (11 th Cir. 1994) (deciding that even though a
housekeeping aid who was periodically absent due to rheumatoid arthritis could perform the
required tasks of emptying trash cans and cleaning floors and bathrooms, the plaintiff"failed to
prove he is an otherwise qualified individual because he failed to satisfy the presence
requirement of the job," allowing the court to affirm summary judgment for the employer), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1052 (1994); Amato v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 987 F. Supp. 523,526-31
(S.D. Tex. 1997) (granting the employer summary judgment on a claim by a nursing care
assistant whose disability caused absenteeism, but who could perform the job tasks of cleaning,
making deliveries, and transporting patients, because "regular attendance is an essential
function," so the plaintiff "cannot be viewed as an otherwise qualified individual"). See
generally Stephen M. Crow, Excessive Absenteeism and the Disabilities Act, 48 ARB. J. 65
(1993) (summarizing case law on the treatment of absenteeism in ADA accommodation claims);
James A. Passamano, Employee Leave Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 861 (1997) (describing cases addressing
whether or not regular and predictable attendance is an essential function under the ADA);
Laura Hartman, Note, The Disabled Employee and Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act:, Where Does Absenteeism Attributable to the Disability Fit Into
the Law?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 905 (1993) (analyzing the treatment of absenteeism in
state law accommodation claims).
141. See, e.g., Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 Fed. Appx. 49, 50-53, 56-57 (4th Cir. 2002)
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placing these individuals beyond the ADA's reach, the courts implicitly are
placing their stamp of approval on a whole array of exclusionary workplace
structures without any inquiry into the viability of less exclusionary
alternatives.
This also has been the case for rules regarding strict start and stop times
142
or rigid shift requirements.143 In Earl v. Mervyn 's, Inc., 44 for example, the
(unpublished) (stating that "[a] regular and reliable level of attendance is an essential function of
one's job," and affirming summary judgment on an ADA claim by an account development
specialist whose depression required him to work part-time); Buckles v. First Data Res., Inc.,
176 F.3d 1098, 1099-1102 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing an ADA claim by an authorizations
agent whose rhinosinusitis caused attendance problems, and his inability to meet the attendance
requirements rendered him unqualified for ADA protection); Corder v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 162
F.3d 924, 925-28 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that because the plaintiff was unable to meet the
"implied essential function" of"regular attendance," she "stands outside the protective reach of
the ADA," therefore warranting summaryjudgment for the employer that fired her as an account
support representative after being absent due to recurrent severe depression and anxiety); Nesser
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442,445-46 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that an employee
whose Crohn's disease caused periodic absences was unqualified and outside the ADA's
protected class because regular attendance was an essential job function, and therefore affirming
summary judgment for the employer); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 527-30 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(deciding that an employee whose ear condition caused periodic absences was not a qualified
individual subject to the Rehabilitation Act's protection because "an essential function of any
government job is an ability to appear for work" and affirming summary judgment for the
employer); Kinnaman v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098, 1100-03 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(granting summary judgment to an employer that fired a plaintiff for absenteeism because the
inability to perform the essential function of "regular and predictable attendance" destroyed the
plaintiff's prima facie ADA case by rendering her an unqualified individual); Warren v. Aetna
Ins. Co., No. 22663-4-11, 1999 WL 615095, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1999) (granting the
employer summary judgment because the plaintiff's lupus rendered her unqualified for ADA
protection by preventing her from performing the "essential function" of "regular attendance");
Robinson-Scott v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1184, 1187-88 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(granting summaryjudgment to an employer that fired the plaintiff for absenteeism caused by
fibrositis, and holding that the plaintiff was not qualified for ADA protection because
"consistent attendance is an essential function" of a flight attendant job); Vorhies v. Pioneer
Mfg. Co., 906 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding that a plaintiff fired for absences due
to a back injury was not a qualified individual covered by the ADA because he could not
perform the "essential function" of "attendance," thereby entitling the employer to summary
judgment); Hendry v. GTE N., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 825 & n.12 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (finding
that a plaintiff whose migraine headaches affected her attendance was not a qualified individual
under the ADA because "regular attendance at work is an essential function of virtually all jobs"
and granting the employer summary judgment).
142. See, e.g., Salmon v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157,1160-63 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (holding that a plaintiff whose back condition caused her to arrive at her guidance
counselor job after her scheduled start time was not a qualified individual because "arriving to
work on time is an essential element" of the job, and therefore granting summaryjudgment to
the employer on the plaintiff's ADA claim).
143. See Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 54-61 (1st Cir. 1998) (affirming
summary judgment for an employer that fired a nurse who sought a nonrotating shift to
accommodate her seizure disorder, and holding that she was not a qualified individual covered
RECAPTURING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL
employer fired Debra Earl from her position as a store area coordinator for
failing to meet strict scheduling start-times.145 Earl had asked the employer to
accommodate her obsessive compulsive disorder by allowing her to clock-in
when she arrived and to make up the time at the end of her shift. 146 Earl argued
that the court should focus on "the specific aspects of her position" to determine
if she was qualified and then assess the impact of a modified start-time under
the undue hardship defense.' 47 Because there was no evidence that Earl "was
unable to complete the duties of her job because of lateness," nor was there
"any evidence of lost sales, lost profits, disruption of store operations, or
increased theft because of her lateness," the requested accommodation likely
imposed no undue hardship on the employer. 148 Nevertheless, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer. 149 The court concluded
that "punctuality is an essential function," thereby rendering Earl unqualified
for ADA protection. 50 The court reached this conclusion because the employer
"placed a high priority on punctuality." The employer mentioned punctuality in
its written handbook and job description and imposed severe consequences for
lateness.' 5' In other words, if the employer acted as if a rigid start-time was
important, that was enough to make it so, despite the lack of evidence of any
business need for the job requirement.
This "presence is an essential function myth"'5' also has doomed
accommodation cases challenging the default requirement of uninterrupted
daily presence. The Seventh Circuit's en banc opinion in EEOC v. Yellow
Freight System, Inc.' is representative. Michael Nicosia alleged that his
by the ADA because she could not perform the essential function of working a rotating shift).
144. Earl v. Mervyn's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11 th Cir. 2000).
145. Id. at 1364-65.
146. Id. at 1364.
147. Id. at 1366.
148. Id. Even if the court's bare conclusion was correct that "the tasks of [her]job as store
area coordinator by their very nature must be performed daily at a specific time," that should
have been analyzed as part of the employer's burden to prove undue hardship, rather than as
part of the plaintiff's burden to prove that she was a qualified individual. Id.
149. Id. at 1364.
150. Id. at 1366.
151. Id.
152. This phrase comes from Audrey E. Smith, Note, The "Presence is an Essential
Function "Myth: The ADA's Trapdoorfor the Chronically lll, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 163, 164,
181 (1995) (arguing that the characterization of workplace presence as an essential function "is
a myth," because "it erroneously assumes that most jobs can be performed only at the
worksite").
153. EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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employer failed to accommodate his HIV/AIDS and related cancer by
modifying its daily attendance policy for dockworkers. 5 4 The court could have
focused on Nicosia's ability to perform his actual job tasks while at work,
including loading and unloading freight, counting freight pieces, and weighing
shipments. 155 Then the court could have analyzed whether modifying the
employer's strict daily attendance policy-by having temporary workers fill in
on occasion, allowing other workers to volunteer for overtime, or allowing
Nicosia to make up hours on different days-would have imposed an undue
hardship on the employer. Instead, the court held that regular daily attendance
at the employer's job site was itself an essential function of the job, thereby
avoiding the undue hardship issue altogether. 15 6  The court reached this
conclusion by assuming that rigid, daily attendance was essential for "most
jobs" and because the employer designated the dockworker position as "full-
time" in its job description. 157 The court noted that "[t]he ADA protects an
important, but finite, universe of people" 1 58 and held that the universe does not
include workers whose disabilities prevent them from meeting an employer's
"assigned, definite, and specific work schedule."' 59 Under this reasoning, any
worker with disability-based absences may be deemed unqualified and outside
of the ADA's protected class.160 This allows employers to retain their rigid
scheduling rules, even when there is no business justification for the default
schedule design because the employer never is required to defend its design
under the undue hardship defense.
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Maziarka v. Mills Fleet
Farm, Inc. 161 when it dismissed Michael Maziarka's ADA claim alleging that
his employer failed to accommodate his severe irritable bowl syndrome by
allowing him to take brief, unscheduled, unpaid leaves from his receiving clerk
job and make up the missed hours on other days. 162 A receiving clerk's job
tasks included receiving and recording shipments, inspecting freight bills,
obtaining driver acknowledgments of order discrepancies, checking in and
154. Id. at 947.
155. See id. at 945 (listing a dockworker's tasks).
156. Id. at 948-50.
157. Id. at 948-49.
158. Id. at 952 (quoting Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1999)).
159. Id. at 949.
160. See id. at 948-52 (citing Waggoner, 169 F.3d at 484-85, for the proposition that "in
most instances the ADA does not protect people who have erratic, unexplained absences, even
when these absences are a result of a disability").
161. Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2001).
162. Id. at 677, 681.
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scanning merchandise, and following up on damaged goods and other shipment
problems.163 Maziarka alleged that he could perform these tasks with short,
periodic leaves.164 The workload was very sporadic, so receiving clerks had
many periods without any work to perform, and shipments did not need to be
recorded immediately because the merchandise was received long before it was
needed on store shelves.16
5
Once again, the court confused the actual work tasks of a receiving clerk
with the employer's malleable practice designating when the tasks are to be
performed. The court held that the employer's default requirement of regular,
uninterrupted attendance was itself an "essential job function" because the
employer had included it in its job description and imposed serious
consequences on employees for violations. 166 Because Maziarka could not
perform the "essential function" of uninterrupted daily attendance, the court
deemed him unqualified and unprotected by the ADA, thus requiring summary
judgment for the employer. 67 Therefore, the employer was allowed to retain its
daily attendance practice--despite its exclusionary effect on disabled
individuals-without showing why or how periodic unpaid leaves would cause
an undue hardship on the firm.
A final context in which courts have made this error is in cases involving
the default requirement of an entirely uninterrupted worklife, which is
challenged by disabled individuals who seek leaves of absence from their
jobs. 168 In these cases, courts could determine whether the individuals can
163. Id. at 677.
164. Id. at681.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 680-81 (noting that the written job description said that clerks receive
merchandise "when it arrives," and Maziarka had "numerous warnings, meetings, and
discussions" because of his absences).
167. Id. at 677,680-81.
168. See, e.g., Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1002-04 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a teacher who took lengthy disability leave was not a qualified individual subject
to ADA protection because at the time of his dismissal he was "unable to perform an essential
function-regular attendance"-and therefore affirming summaryjudgment for the employer);
Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 194-95, 197-98 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming
summary judgment for an employer that fired a computer consultant after taking a leave for a
back injury, even though he could perform all job tasks when not on leave, because the ability
"to come to work on a regular basis" was an essential job function that rendered the employee
unqualified under the ADA); Davis v. Pitney Bowes, No. 95 Civ. 4765 (LAP), 1997 WL
655935, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1997) (finding it "axiomatic that an employee who
cannot show up for work cannot perform an 'essential function' of her job" and granting
summary judgment to an employer that fired an employee who was on leave for a back injury
and who was therefore unqualified and outside of the ADA's protected class); Kennedy v.
Applause, Inc., CV 94-5344 SVW (GHKx), 1994 WL 740765, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1994)
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perform the actual job tasks both before and after their leaves of absence, and if
so, whether providing a leave creates an undue hardship on the employer.
Under that approach, courts would uphold an employer's decision to fire a
disabled individual who needs a leave of absence only when the default
assumption of an uninterrupted worklife really is too difficult to alter. Instead,
courts are characterizing the demand for an uninterrupted worklife as itself an
essential job function, which allows courts to deem all of these employees
unqualified and outside of the ADA's protected category. This allows courts to
dismiss these cases on summary judgment without ever assessing whether job-
sharing arrangements, the hiring of temporary workers, or the creation of other
alternative work structures could serve the employer's needs.
As a recent article aptly described, individuals with disabilities really do
represent "the incredible shrinking protected class,"'169 in part because of the
way that workplace essentialism has infiltrated judges' interpretation of the
ADA. This essentialist approach illustrates the process of "capture through
construal.' 170 Although the ADA's accommodation mandate has the potential
to transform default organizational structures such as the full-time face-time
norm, that norm itself has captured judges' statutory interpretation. By treating
default structures as taken-for-granted background rules17' when assessing who
falls within the protected class, courts end up retrenching and reifying the very
same conventional workplace structures that the ADA was intended to subvert.
B. Identifying "Particular Employment Practices" Under Title VII
The ADA is not the only employment discrimination law that is at risk
because of workplace essentialism. Courts also have been undermining the
transformative potential of Title VII's disparate impact model, particularly in
sex discrimination claims. Although the specific doctrinal path in Title VII
disparate impact cases is different from the doctrinal path in ADA
(granting summary judgment to an employer that fired a plaintiff for taking leaves for chronic
fatigue syndrome, and holding that the plaintiff s failure to "maintain a regular and reliable level
of attendance" rendered her unqualified and beyond the ADA's coverage), aftd, 90 F.3d 1477
(9th Cir. 1996).
169. See Smith, supra note 152, at 184 (arguing that "the 'presence is an essential function'
myth precludes ADA coverage for an entire class of disabled individuals"). See generally
Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope ofDisability
Under The Americans With Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 107 (1997).
170. See Krieger, supra note 9, at 486 (defining "capture through construal").
171. Id.
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accommodation claims, the underlying analytic error and resulting "capture"
from workplace essentialism are analogous. 1
72
Title VII's disparate impact theory prohibits employers from using facially
neutral practices that disproportionately affect the employment opportunities of
protected class members. 173 Because this model focuses on inequitable results
and does not require discriminatory intent by the employer, 74 this model holds
great potential for addressing aspects of women's inequality that stem from
workplace organizational norms that create, retrench, or magnify women's
disproportionate conflicts between work and family. 
75
To state a prima facie disparate impact case, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that a facially neutral "particular" employment practice causes women to
experience substantially different opportunities or employment status than
172. Under the ADA, plaintiffs are not limited to the accommodation theory of
discrimination, but may use the disparate impact theory as well. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(1),
1211 2(b)(3), 12112(b)(6), 12113(a) (2000) (defining discrimination to include classifications
that have an adverse effect, or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities). However,
'almost no ADA disability disparate impact cases exist." Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L.
Willbom, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1197, 1240 & n. 10 1 (2003). Future plaintiffs may begin framing their ADA cases as disparate
impact cases instead of, or in addition to, accommodation cases now that the United States
Supreme Court explicitly has endorsed this approach. See High Court Endorses Disparate-
Impact Theory, [Issue 1356, No. 866, Pt. 2] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 1, at 1-2, 4 (Feb. 24, 2004)
(discussing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003)); High Court Endorses Disparate-
Impact Theory, [No. 148] Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) 4, at 4-5 (Mar. 30, 2004)
(explaining the Raytheon decision).
173. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(k)(I)(A)(i), 2000e-2(a) (2000) (listing the elements of a disparate impact claim).
174. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
175. Many scholars have argued that the disparate impact model could be applied to a
variety of exclusionary or marginalizing workplace norms. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 16,
at 104-07 (discussing part-time work and the design of the promotion track); Abrams, supra
note 10, at 1223-24, 1227 (noting "the protracted evaluation period (often six to ten years) that
precedes promotion decisions," and "[h]erculean time commitments, frequent travel, and
stringent limits on absenteeism"); Nancy E. Dowd, Taking Sex Differences Into Account, 54
FoRDAM L, REv. 699, 734 (1986) (describing "no-leave or inadequate leave policies"); Ame L.
Kalleberg, Part-Time, Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52
WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 771, 780, 782-83, 796-97 (1995) (discussing the model's treatment of
part-time work); Herma Hill Kay, Equality & Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 32 (1985) (examining no-leave or inadequate leave policies for pregnancy);
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for Pregnancy,
Breastfeeding, and Childcare, 44 ViLL. L. REv. 355, 356 (1999) (noting inadequate leaves for
pregnancy, breastfeeding, and childcare); Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 341-
74 (discussing telecommuting arrangements); Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality
Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 940-45 (1985)
(considering inflexible job descriptions and inadequate leave policies).
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men. 176 Although plaintiffs often meet this burden through statistical evidence,
the Supreme Court has rejected the use of strict mathematical formulas. 17 7 The
disparity need only be "sufficiently substantial" to raise "an inference of
causation." 78 If the plaintiff states a prima facie case, then the employer may
assert an affirmative defense by proving that the practice is "job related" and
"consistent with business necessity. ' 79 Even if the employer meets that
burden, the plaintiff still may succeed by demonstrating that a less
discriminatory alternative employment practice serves the employer's business
needs. 80 Although this model is not as explicit as the ADA's accommodation
model regarding the goal of workplace redesign, the remedy available in a
disparate impact claim may have even more widespread transformative
potential. If a plaintiff succeeds in a disparate impact case, a court may require
the employer to eliminate the exclusionary workplace practice for all
workers,' 8' rather than just requiring an employer to modify an existing practice
for an individual employee as is done in an ADA accommodation case.
When an employer's default organizational structures exclude women
with childcare responsibilities from the workplace, courts have two possible
approaches to interpreting Title VII's disparate impact model. Just like in the
ADA accommodation context, judges can take a transformative approach that
would require employers to restructure the existing workplace design, or they
can take an essentialist approach that treats the existing design as immutable
and beyond the reach of Title VII. Under either approach, judges must begin
by determining whether a facially neutral particular employment practice exists
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (stating that a disparate impact claim requires a
demonstration that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact on protected class
members); Lye, supra note 11, at 343 ("A plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact must demonstrate disparity, identify a specific employment practice which
allegedly cause the disparity, and prove causation.").
177. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
178. Id. at 995; see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (stating that a
disparate impact plaintiff only needs to show a "significantly discriminatory pattern").
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
180. Id. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1 )(A)(ii), 2000e-2(k)(l)(C).
181. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that "[i]f an
employment practice which operates to exclude [members of a protected class] cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited"); see also Schwab & Willborn,
supra note 172, at 1238 ("The standard judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact case
requires the employer to change the policy or standard for everyone, not just the protected
group."); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate
Impact Cause ofAction: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1479, 1481 (1996) (stating
that the remedy in a disparate impact claim is to enjoin the employer from using the challenged
practice); Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 329-30 (comparing the remedies in
disparate impact and accommodation claims).
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that disproportionately excludes women, who are required to have a specific
target for their disparate impact claim. Identifying a job's "particular
employment practices" is the point at which the two possible approaches first
diverge.
Under the transformative approach, judges would distinguish a job's
actual required tasks from the malleable organizational norms governing the
when, where, and how of task performance, and they would treat the latter as
particular practices regarding the former. When women challenge an
exclusionary default structure, such as the full-time face-time norm, this
approach would characterize the default workplace structure as a proper subject
for disparate impact review. The employer would be required to eliminate the
organizational structure and replace it with a less discriminatory alternative
workplace design unless the employer could defend the conventional design as
"job related" and "consistent with business necessity" (which often will not be
possible). This approach would force employers to demonstrate a business
justification in order to resist workplace restructuring and retain an
exclusionary workplace norm.
As Part IV will demonstrate, this transformative approach has significant
support in Title VIl's language and implementing regulations and in the
Supreme Court's disparate impact jurisprudence. Nevertheless, only a few
courts have interpreted Title VII to advance its transformative goals. 8 2 Just as
workplace essentialism has allowed employers to retain the full-time face-time
norm despite significant countervailing forces, so workplace essentialism has
allowed most courts to ignore Title VII's transformative potential and further
retrench the workplace status quo.
The majority of judges who have interpreted Title VII's disparate impact
model through the lens of workplace essentialism diverge from the
transformative approach by failing to distinguish between actual job tasks and
the default organizational norms regarding when, where, and how the actual
tasks get performed. Just like in the ADA context, these judges assume that
jobs are defined at least in part by their existing default structures. Thus, these
judges characterize the elements of the full-time face-time norm as part of the
work itself, rather than as a choice of practice for organizing work performance.
Under this approach, a woman who experiences disproportionate conflicts
between work and family as a result of a default workplace structure will have
no cognizable target for her disparate impact claim, which requires the plaintiff
to challenge a particular employment practice.18 3 This allows courts to dismiss
182. See infra notes 428-58 and accompanying text (collecting relevant cases).
183. See Dowd, supra note 15, at 141-42 (arguing that Title VII cannot restructure the
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such cases before trial for failure to state a prima facie case, without ever
reaching the employer's "job related" and "consistent with business necessity"
defense. Employers, in turn, are never required to demonstrate a business need
for their organizational norms, which ends up shielding an entire set of
exclusionary workplace structures from Title VII antidiscrimination review.
Once again, the result is that even unnecessary aspects of the essentialized
workplace remain intact, and courts further relegitimate the existing workplace
structures in the process.
As in the ADA accommodation context, courts have made this error
frequently in Title VII disparate impact claims challenging the
disproportionately negative effect that the entire array of full-time face-time
requirements has on women workers. Cases challenging rigid daily work
schedules are one common example. In Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-
Illinois,8 4 for instance, Jennifer Dormeyer alleged that the bank's rigid
attendance policies disparately impacted pregnant women who may be unable
to work traditional hours at a central worksite because of morning sickness or
other complications.' The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
Dormeyer's claim on summary judgment. 8 6 Rather than characterizing the
bank's absenteeism policies as "practices" that are subject to disparate impact
review, the court characterized them as "legitimate requirements" of the job.
187
The court defined employment practices narrowly to include only discrete
"eligibility requirements," such as "requiring that applicants for a job as a
dishwasher have a high school education."18 The court failed to recognize that
although default structures involve basic issues of when and where work is
workplace to ameliorate work and family conflicts because of its "inability to reach cases in
which an employer has failed to adopt any policy"); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap:
Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic
and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 413-15 (2001) (arguing that Title
Vii's disparate impact theory has limited ability to restructure the workplace to address work
and family conflicts because courts have not characterized the absence of an affirmative policy
as employer conduct); Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 355-56 (describing
cases in which courts have held that default organizational structures represent the absence of
any policy subject to disparate impact challenge).
184. Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.).
185. Id. at 583-84. The bank fired Dormeyer from her job as a bank teller after nine
absences that she attributed to "severe morning sickness." Id. at 581. She sued under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which amended Title VII's definition of "sex" to include
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000); Dormeyer,
223 F.3d at 581, 583.
186. Dormeyer, 223 F.3dat 581,585.
187. Id. at 583-84.
188. Id. at 583.
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performed, they still represent choices about how to organize work tasks, rather
than the underlying tasks themselves.
By characterizing the bank's attendance policies as the "work for which
she had been hired," 1 89 rather than as particular employment practices
governing the performance of Dormeyer's work, the Seventh Circuit effectively
placed default hour requirements beyond Title VII's reach. By defining the
aspect of the workplace that disproportionately excluded women as the work
itself, Dormeyer was left without any particular practice against which to lodge
her disparate impact challenge. The court was able to dismiss her claim for
failure to state a prima facie case without ever requiring the bank to defend the
business necessity of its rules governing periodic absences. Of course, some
employers' rigid attendance rules indeed are imperative because of customer
interaction or other core job demands. The court, however, could have required
the bank to prove that its particular attendance policies were among those that
actually are linked to business needs. Instead, the Seventh Circuit insulated all
such exclusionary default hour requirements-both the necessary and the
unnecessary-from antidiscrimination review. The court also eliminated
Dormeyer's opportunity to demonstrate an alternative method for addressing
periodic absences that may have a less disparate impact on women, thereby
entrenching the exclusionary norm.
The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp.'90 when it affirmed the dismissal of Wilma Stout's disparate impact
claim on summary judgment. 191 Stout was fired after having a miscarriage that
caused her to be absent from her job as a material handler. 92 She alleged that
the employer's policy of firing employees with more than three absences during
a ninety-day probationary period disproportionately affected pregnant
women. 193  Rather than characterizing the employer's strict probationary
attendance requirement as a particular employment practice subject to disparate
impact review, the Fifth Circuit seemed to characterize the requirement as the
lack of a medical leave or vacation policy. 94 As a result, Stout was unable to
establish the first element of her prima facie case, which requires the plaintiff to
189. Id. at 584.
190. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002).
191. Id. at 858.
192. Id. at 858-59.
193. Id. at 859.
194. See id. at 859-62 (translating the employer's "strict attendance policy" into the
employer's lack of "vacation time or medical leave" and focusing on the latter, rather than the
former, when assessing the plaintiff's disparate impact claim).
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"identify the employment practice that has the allegedly disproportionate
impact."' 95
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit assumed that the employer's
default attendance requirements were "actual, legitimate requirements of the
job,"'196 thereby confusing the malleable design of when work is performed with
the underlying tasks of Stout's position. While it is possible that business
necessity does demand rigid attendance during the first three months of a
material handler's job, the court never required the employer to demonstrate
such need, nor did the court allow Stout to propose an alternative probationary
attendance policy with a less exclusionary effect on pregnant women. By
characterizing the employer's rules as the absence of a particular leave policy,
rather than as the existence of an attendance practice that disproportionately
excluded pregnant women, the court never had to look beyond the prima facie
case. 197
Courts have used this same illusory distinction between acts and omissions
when upholding employers' reliance on the "word-of-mouth" of incumbent
employees for recruiting new workers-a process that tends to perpetuate any
existing workplace imbalance. In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works,' 98
the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claim that word-of-mouth hiring at a
nondiverse workplace disparately impacted racial minorities. 99 The court held
that "passive reliance on employee word-of-mouth recruiting" did not constitute
195. Id. at 860. The court also ruled that Stout failed to establish disparate effects, which is
another element of the prima facie case. Id. at 860-62.
196. Id. at 862.
197. Courts have used this line between employment practices and the "lack" thereof to
dismiss similar disparate impact claims challenging other default work structures. See Kessler,
supra note 183, at 412-15 (discussing the limits of the disparate impact theory); Travis, The
Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 355-56 (collecting cases dismissing disparate impact
claims). For example, in Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ind. 1987),
aff'd, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988), a class of female clerical and office workers sued for sex
discrimination after their employer refused them an annual wage and benefit increase, while
granting trades and craft workers a six percent increase. Id. at 1465-67. The women alleged
that they were disparately impacted by the employer's requirement that the predominantly
female group of clerical and office workers bargain separately from the predominantly male
group of trades and craft workers, and by the employer's use of market wage surveys in wage
negotiations. Id. at 1468-70. The district court found that setting wages and benefits was a
"single decision," which was "not a policy or practice for disparate impact purposes," and
therefore, the court granted the employer summary judgment. Id. The court concluded that
employers that set wages according to market forces are passive "price-takers," rather than
active wage-setters, and therefore are "not following a policy in any meaningful sense." Id. at
1469.
198. EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
199. Id. at 304-05.
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"a particular employment practice, ''200 which left the plaintiffs without a hook
to hang their disparate impact claim. Although recruiting through incumbent
employees' word-of-mouth is as much a hiring practice as recruiting through
any other method, the court held that "for purposes of disparate impact, a more
affirmative act by the employer must be shown., 20' While this case involved
race rather than sex, it illustrates the scope of courts' preference for allowing
traditional workplace structures to avoid scrutiny under antidiscrimination law.
Courts have used a similar approach when dismissing disparate impact
claims challenging employers' default preference for full-time over part-time
positions. The Seventh Circuit illustrated this approach in Ilhardt v. Sara Lee
Corp.202 when it affirmed the dismissal of Lora Ilhardt's claim on summary
judgment. 20 3 Ilhardt was laid-off from her part-time in-house counsel position,
and she alleged that her employer's use of part-time status as a selection criteria
for the reduction-in-force "constitute[d] an employment policy that has a
disparate impact on women," who make up the majority of the part-time
workforce. 204 The court held that Ilhardt failed to show "that Sara Lee's
decision to eliminate her job was a particular employment practice within the
meaning of Title VII.020 5 Because this left Ilhardt without a specific target for
her prima facie case, the court granted the employer's summary judgment
motion without ever requiring the employer to demonstrate that using the
exclusionary lay-off criteria was consistent with business needs. In addition,
Ilhardt never had the opportunity to demonstrate whether less discriminatory
alternative lay-off criteria existed.
200. Id. at 305.
201. Id.; see also Krieger, supra note 9, at 494 (explaining that courts have been upholding
word-of-mouth recruiting "with increasing frequency" because judges view such a practice "not
as part of the problem, but simply as part of 'the common nature of things"').
202. 1lhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997).
203. Id. at 1152.
204. Id. at 1152, 1157.
205. Id. at 1156 (holding that "[t]he [reduction-in-force] was an isolated incident, not a
regular occurrence, and a one-time decision to lay off a part-time attorney can hardly be called
an employment practice"); see also Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 38 F.
Supp. 2d 18, 19-21 (D.D.C. 1999) (dismissing a pregnant plaintiff's sex discrimination claim
challenging her employer's demand that she move from part-time to full-time by characterizing
the case as a losing disparate treatment claim, rather than analyzing the disparate impact that a
full-time demand may have on women workers); Schallop v. N.Y. State Dep't of Law, 20 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 388-403 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that firing her because
she worked part-time constituted sex discrimination and not addressing whether the preference
for full-time workers is a practice that disparately impacts women who are the majority of the
part-time workforce).
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Another context in which courts have assumed the fixed nature of the
workplace is in disparate impact cases challenging the default requirement of
an entirely uninterrupted worklife. In particular, courts have rejected claims
alleging that inadequate leave provisions disproportionately impact women due
to pregnancy and childcare responsibilities. In Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co.,206
for example, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Martha Wallace's
disparate impact claim. 207 Wallace's employer had fired her after she requested
a six-week leave of absence because she was unable to wean her child from
breastfeeding. °8 Wallace alleged that the inadequate leave policy disparately
impacted women. 20 9 The district court declined to characterize the relevant
employment practice to include all aspects of the employer's leave policy.
Instead, the district court defined the practice to include only those situations
for which the employer had agreed to allow personal leaves. 210  By
characterizing Wallace's challenge as an attack on the exclusion of a particular
situation from the employer's existing leave practice, rather than as part of the
particular employment practice at issue, the district court defined away the very
basis for Wallace's disparate impact claim. The court found no violation of
Title VII because the employer treated women and men equally with respect to
the specific types of leaves that the employer actually granted.11 Under that
reasoning, it became entirely irrelevant that the excluded situation at issue,
breastfeeding, is an attribute unique to women.1 2
By starting with the premise that the default requirement of an
uninterrupted worklife is a non-practice, courts are able to characterize
disparate impact challenges to related workplace structures as requests for
preferential treatment. If the district court in Wallace had recognized that
excluding breastfeeding from permissible leave situations really is a practice
designed to favor the worklives of men, then the court properly would have
seen Wallace's disparate impact claim as a demand for equal opportunity.
Instead, the Wallace court defined the default workplace structure as the
gender-neutral absence of a particular leave policy, which allowed the court to
206. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 351
(6th Cir. 1991).
207. Id. at 868.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 869-70 (looking solely at "those circumstances for which [the employer]
will grant personal leave," rather than analyzing the employer's decision to "exclud[e] breast-
feeding" from its leave provision).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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characterize Wallace's claim as a request for special benefits that are not
available to men.213
The Seventh Circuit illustrated this faulty logic even more explicitly in
Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.214 when it affirmed the dismissal of
Kimberly Hem Troupe's disparate impact claim. 2 5 One day before a planned
maternity leave, Troupe was fired for tardiness caused by severe morning
sickness.21 6 She claimed that the employer's rigid attendance rules and
inadequate leave policy disproportionately affected pregnant women.217 The
Seventh Circuit implicitly characterized the default requirement of a full-time,
uninterrupted worklife as a neutral given, rather than as a particular practice
designed around the life patterns of men. This allowed the court to characterize
Troupe's challenge to the employer's default structure as a "warrant for
favoritism," rather than as a "means for dealing with the residues of past
discrimination. 21 8 By viewing the lack of leave policies as the gender-neutral
absence of any particular employment practice, the court concluded that Title
VII does not "require employers to offer maternity leave or to take other steps
to make it easier to work," nor does it require employers "to make it as easy" for
pregnant women "as it is for their spouses to continue working.
2 1 9
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Stout v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp.22° when it dismissed a claim alleging that an inadequate leave
provision for probationary employees disparately impacted pregnant women.221
By viewing the employer's rigid hour and attendance rules as the gender-
neutral absence of a particular employment practice, rather than as a specific
policy favoring the worklives of male workers who are unaffected by
pregnancy, the court was able to characterize Stout's disparate impact claim as
a demand for "preferential treatment of pregnant employees. 2 22 The Third
Circuit agrees, having held that Title VII "does not require an employer to grant
213. See id. at 868-70 (stating that "[niothing in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or
Title VII, obliges employers to accommodate the child-care concerns of breast-feeding female
workers by providing additional breast-feeding leave not available to male workers").
214. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Corp., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.).
215. Id. at 738.
216. Id. at 735-36.
217. Id. at 737.
218. Id. at 738.
219. Id.
220. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002).
221. Id. at 859-62.
222. Id. at 861 (holding that Title V1l, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
"does not require employers to treat pregnancy related absences more leniently than other
absences").
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maternity leave or to reinstate an employee after maternity leave. 2 23 In
reaching that conclusion, the Third Circuit severely blunted Title VII's
transformative potential by stating, in sweeping terms, that Title VII may be
used only as a "shield against discrimination," and not as a "sword.
2 24
Once again, the process of "capture through construal" is in action.22 5
While Title VII's disparate impact model has the potential to substitute less
exclusionary alternatives for default organizational structures related to the full-
time face-time norm, that norm itself has captured judges' statutory
interpretation. Moreover, by essentializing the existing workplace and treating
default structures as the unassailable background, rather than as foreground
practices that are subject to disparate impact review, courts effectively are
relegitimating and further retrenching the existing exclusionary design.
IV. A Plan for Recapture
Revealing the doctrinal methods by which workplace essentialism is
allowing courts to undermine the transformative potential of the ADA and Title
VII is the first step toward recapturing that untapped potential. This Part takes
a step further. For both statutes, this Part demonstrates the ways in which the
doctrinal use of workplace essentialism is inconsistent with the statutory
language, objectives, and regulatory guidance. In doing so, this Part defends an
alternative approach to interpreting the ADA and Title VII in cases challenging
default organizational structures-an approach that would allow
antidiscrimination law more effectively to redesign the entrenched aspects of
the full-time face-time norm.
A. Removing Barriers with the ADA
When an employer's default organizational structures exclude individuals
with disabilities, courts interpreting the ADA are not limited to the essentialist
approach, described above, in which judges equate the full-time face-time norm
with actual work tasks that are treated as "essential functions of the job." There
is an alternative approach that is more consistent with the ADA's
transformative objectives because it does not begin with any assumptions about
223. Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1997) (ignoring the
disparate impact theory).
224. Id.
225. See Krieger, supra note 9, at 486 (defining "capture through construal").
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the inherent nature of the existing workplace design. Under this alternative
approach, judges would begin by distinguishing actual job tasks from malleable
organizational norms regarding the when, where, and how of task performance.
While the former are indeed "functions" that may or may not be "essential," the
latter are not "functions" in the first place. With the lens of workplace
essentialism thus removed, a disabled individual's need to modify a default
workplace structure would not render the individual "unqualified" for ADA
protection due to the inability to perform an essential function of the job.
Instead, courts would treat the individual's need as a proper accommodation
request-a request for a workplace modification that would allow the employee
to perform the actual underlying essential job functions. The business impact,
if any, from modifying the full-time face-time norm would be analyzed under
the employer's undue hardship defense. This would force employers finally to
confront their own reliance on workplace essentialism. Employers would need
to demonstrate a business justification in order to retain an exclusionary
workplace norm, rather than courts shielding both necessary and unnecessary
default structures from antidiscrimination review.
This alternative approach shows greater respect for the ADA's primary
objectives of achieving "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency" for individuals with disabilities.2 26 The
ADA addresses employment as only one component of a broad strategy for
integrating disabled individuals into all aspects of civic life, including "housing,
public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.
' 227
To achieve these broad objectives of overcoming isolation and segregation, the
ADA is explicit about the need to tackle all of the multifaceted sources of
discrimination, which extend beyond "outright intentional exclusion" and
include such things as "architectural, transportation, and communication
barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN APPLICATIONS
FOR BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON IS A "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH
A DISABILITY" UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA), I I(A)( 1) (Feb.
12, 1997) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE ON QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS] (explaining that "Congress
passed the ADA to enable individuals with disabilities to participate fully in all aspects of
society, particularly employment").
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000); see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON QUALIFIED
INDIVIDUALS, supra note 226, I1 ("The primary purposes underlying the ADA are the
elimination of barriers that prevent individuals with disabilities from participating in 'the
economic and social mainstream of American life' and the provision of equal employment and
other opportunities for persons with disabilities.") (footnote omitted); Lipman, supra note 15, at
409 (explaining that the ADA's "underlying foundation" is "integrationism").
62 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 3 (2005)
existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and
criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities,
benefits, jobs, and other opportunities.0 28  As the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) has explained, the ADA's employment
provisions, including the definition of a "qualified individual," have been
"tailored to the broad remedial purposes of the Act" and must be interpreted
"[c]onsistent with these goals. 2 29 These goals are undermined when courts
treat default workplace structures and organizational norms as fixed and
essential job characteristics, thereby disqualifying many disabled individuals
from ADA protection and shielding the exclusionary structures from legal
review.
Such an approach also ignores the emphasis on workplace redesign in the
ADA's accommodation mandate. The ADA defines "discriminate" to include
"not making reasonable accommodations" and denying job opportunities
because an accommodation is needed.2 a° The essence of the accommodation
duty is "job restructuring."231 According to the EEOC's regulations, "[t]he
reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which
barriers to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability
are removed or alleviated. 23 2 The barriers that are the intended targets of the
ADA's accommodation mandate are defined very broadly and come in "many
different kinds. 2 33 According to the EEOC, these barriers are not limited to
"physical or structural obstacles that inhibit or prevent the access of an
individual with a disability, 23 4 but also encompass any exclusionary aspect of
the "work environment, 2 35 including "policies,'0 36 "practice[s],, '231 "inflexible
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)(2000).
229. EEOC GUIDANCE ON QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS, supra note 226, 1.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000).
231. See id. § 1211 1(9)(B) (defining accommodation to include "job restructuring"); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2004) (noting that reasonable accommodation may include
job restructuring); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSFIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, "Reasonable Accommodation" (Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter EEOC
GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION] (including job restructuring under possible
reasonable accommodations); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, at 1-5 (1992) [hereinafter EEOC MANUAL] (noting job restructuring as a
reasonable accommodation).
232. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2004).
233. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-2.
234. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2004).
235. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at I-I, I-1, 111-3; see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
background (2004) (stating that employers may need to adjust the work environment to
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job procedures, 238 "organizational structures, 239 the "when or how" of job
performance, 240 "the manner or circumstances in which the job customarily is
performed,, 241 or simply, "the way things usually are done. '242 Because all of
these types of barriers are described as appropriate targets for the ADA's
accommodation mandate, courts should not be treating default organizational
structures as essential functions that are immunized from the accommodation
demand.
In addition, such an approach ignores the ADA's requirement of an
individualized, case-by-case inquiry into each employee's qualified status
243
and into each specific accommodation request, 244 which the United States
Supreme Court has recognized as a statutory obligation. 24' This case-by-case
approach is necessitated by the ADA's "focus on individual rather than group
characteristics,, 246 and is "essential if qualified individuals of varying abilities
are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an infinitely diverse range of
accommodate a disabled individual); see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION, supra note 23 1, 1 "Reasonable Accommodation" (listing "'modifications or
adjustments to the work environment... that enable a qualified individual with a disability to
perform the essential functions of that position"' as a category of accommodation) (footnote
omitted).
236. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2004); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-2, 111-5.
237. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at Il-1.
238. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2004).
239. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(d) (2004).
240. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-5; see EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, "Reasonable Accommodation" (stating that
accommodation requires changing workplace barriers, including an employer's procedures as to
when or how work is performed); id. I "Job Restructuring" (stating that job restructuring can
include altering when or how work is performed).
241. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-2; see 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (2004)
(defining accommodation to include modifying the customary manner or circumstances of work
performance); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. background (2004) (same); EEOC GUIDANCE ON
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 23 1, 1 "Reasonable Accommodation" (same).
242. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at I-1, 111-2.
243. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. background (2004) (requiring a case-by-case
determination of a worker's capabilities); id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.5 (same); EEOC GUIDANCE
ON QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS, supra note 226, 77 I(A)(2), I(C)(l) (same); EEOC MANUAL, supra
note 23 1,at 1I-l (same).
244. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-6 (noting that "every reasonable
accommodation must be determined on an individual basis" and providing a step-by-step
process); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2004) (describing the individualized
process for identifying a reasonable accommodation).
245. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
246. EEOC GUIDANCE ON QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS, supra note 226, I(A)(I).
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jobs. ''2 47 The regulations explain that the individualized process requires an
assessment of both the specific job at issue and the particular limitations of the
worker who is requesting an accommodation.24 s With regard to the job at issue,
an individualized assessment means "analyzing the actual job duties and
determining the true purpose or object of the job. 2 49 Courts are failing to
undertake this case-by-case assessment whenever they assume that a default
organizational structure is an immutable and therefore essential job function.
The Sixth Circuit has criticized such an essentialist approach, particularly
when courts have "presumed that regular and predictable attendance is [a] job
requirement," which "naturally leads to the conclusion that an individual who
must occasionally request medical leave is unqualified., 250 According to the
Sixth Circuit, this presumption "eviscerates the individualized attention that the
Supreme Court has deemed 'essential' in each disability claim.",25 "If we were
to presume that uninterrupted attendance in all instances is a mandatory job
requirement," explained the court, "then the policies and needs of both the
individual employer and employee would never be considered. ' 252 For that
reason, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that "no presumption should exist that
uninterrupted attendance is an essential job requirement" and that a leave of
absence "can constitute a reasonable accommodation under appropriate
circumstances.
2 53
Most courts, however, have not been as careful as the Sixth Circuit in
interpreting the ADA consistent with the individualized inquiry requirement or
the ADA's broad integrative and transformative objectives. Courts that
unquestioningly have treated the default work structures related to the full-time
face-time norm as essential job functions instead have focused exclusively on a
single, narrow provision in the statute. That provision states that "consideration
shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
247. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. background (2004).
248. Id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9.
249. Id. (explaining that "[s]uch an assessment is necessary to ascertain which job
functions are the essential functions that an accommodation must enable an individual with a
disability to perform").
250. Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir.
1998).
251. Id. at 782 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987));
see also Smith, supra note 152, at 163, 172 (arguing that ajudicially-created "blanket rule" that
treats uninterrupted presence as an essential function of most jobs is "in contravention of the
case-by-case approach mandated by the ADA").
252. Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 782.
253. Id. at 783.
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advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. 
2 54
Although this provision is not framed in absolute terms, it has become the
ipse dixit trump card for employers, allowing them to essentialize default
organizational norms based on nothing more than the historic tenacity of these
employment structures.2 5 When an employer plays this trump card, courts
have been willing to treat default employment structures as essential job
functions based simply on the fact that the employer always has required
employees to perform the job in that particular manner,25 6 or the fact that the
employer has included the default structure in its own job description or
employment policy,25 7 or the fact that the employer has imposed severe
254. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
255. This phrase comes from Conneen v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318 (3d
Cir. 2003), in which the court took the unusual step of requiring an employer to produce more
than just its "own ipse dixit" to show that a rigid start-time was an essential function of the job.
Id. at 329. In contrast, most courts hold that judges should not "second guess an employer's
judgment in describing the essential functions of the job." Caroselli v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 A.D.
Cases (BNA) 596, 600 (N.D. I11. 2004).
256. See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.
2004) (holding that full-time presence at a central administrative center was an essential
function of a service coordinator's job in part because "all of its service coordinators work their
entire shift at the administration centers," and the employer "has never permitted a service
coordinator to work anywhere other than an administrative center"); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33
Fed. Appx. 49, 57 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (holding that a full-time job schedule was an
essential function of an account development specialist's job in part because the employer had
never employed anyone on a part-time basis in the past); Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205
F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that mandatory overtime was an essential
function of the job based on the employer's assertion that all of the workers in that position had
worked substantial overtime in the past); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 59 (1 st Cir.
1998) (holding that a rotating shift was an essential function of a particular nursing position in
part because "the Hospital has always required all non-senior staff nurses to rotate shifts, and it
has never made an exception"); Caroselli, 15 A.D. Cases at 600 (holding that a full-time
schedule was an essential function of a channel manager job in part because "all of the Channel
Managers... work a full-time schedule"); Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A.
94-9606, 1996 WL 131948, at *3-8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996) (holding that a fifty-hour
workweek and working one night a week were essential functions of a general manager position
in part because the employer characterized them as a "normal requirement" that the employer
had always demanded); see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 364 (noting that "courts
generally accept employer assertions about the hours required to complete the job, treating
existing practices as a justification for the norm").
257. See, e.g., EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (holding that uninterrupted daily attendance was an essential function ofa dockworker job
because the employer described the position as "full-time" in its job description); Earl v.
Mervyn's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that "punctuality is an essential
function" of a store area coordinator's job in part because the employer referenced punctuality
in a written handbook and job description); Buckles v. First Data Res., Inc., 176 F.3d 1098,
1100-01 (8th Cir. 1999) (using the fact that the employer had detailed attendance policies and
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consequences for deviations from the norm,258 or merely based on the
employer's own unsubstantiated characterization.5 9 In other words, the more
rigidly exclusionary the employer has been in the past, the more likely the court
is to allow the employer to be rigidly exclusionary in the future, regardless of
any demonstrated business need for the practice in question.
Nothing in this statutory provision on employer deference, however,
requires courts so automatically to equate evidence that "it has always been"
with the conclusion that "it must be so." The regulations properly interpret the
statutory phrase "consideration shall be given" to mean that deference to an
employer's characterization is neither absolute nor exclusive in nature. The
regulations provide a noninclusive list of factors that courts should consider
when determining whether a job function is essential, 260 and the EEOC's
procedures as a reason for treating attendance as an essential function of an authorizations
agent's job); Kinnarnan v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(holding that "regular and predictable attendance" was an essential function of an assembler's
job in part because the employer had "detailed attendance policies"); Robinson-Scott v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1188 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (concluding that "consistent
attendance is an essential function" because an employee handbook mentioned the need for
punctuality); Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 94-9606, 1996 WL 131948,
at *3-8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996) (holding that a fifty-hour workweek and working one night a
week were essential functions of a general manager position in part because the policies were
noted in the company's job description); Barfield v. Bell S. Telecomm., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1321,
1326 n.8, 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (using the existence of a company policy stressing the
importance of regular attendance as a basis for concluding that "regular and predictable
attendance is an essential function" of a service representative job).
258. See, e.g., Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that uninterrupted attendance was an essential function of the job in part because of the
"numerous warnings, meetings, and discussions" that the employer conducted due to the
plaintiff's absences); Earl v. Mervyn's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that
"punctuality is an essential function" of a store area coordinator's job in part because the
employer imposed severe consequences for tardiness); Kinnaman v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (holding that "regular and predictable attendance" was an
essential function of an assembler's job in part because the employer "did not take abuse of the
attendance policies lightly"); Hendry v. GTE N., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 825 & n. 12 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (using the fact that the plaintiff's supervisor "was a stickler" about attendance as a reason
for concluding that regular attendance was an essential function of the job).
259. See, e.g., Caroselli, 15 A.D. Cases at 600 (declining to "second guess an employer's
judgment in describing the essential functions of the job"); Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268
F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2001) (refusing to question an employer's assessment of the essential
job functions); Aquinas v. Fed. Express Corp., 940 F. Supp. 73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(concluding that regular attendance was an essential function because the employer had
"informed its employees repeatedly and unambiguously that daily attendance is imperative to the
success of its operations") (internal quotation omitted).
260. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004). According to the regulations:
Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job
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Interpretive Guidance explains that "all relevant evidence should be
considered. "26' As noted by the EEOC, the legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend for the employer's judgment about which job functions
are essential to be the "only evidence," or even the "prevailing evidence. ' 262 In
fact, the "more relevant evidence" should come from "a review of the actual
work performed. 
2 63
A few courts have started to recognize that the ADA's provision on
employer deference is being overworked at the expense of the ADA's broader
objectives. In Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.,2 4 for example, the employer
argued that Mario Echazabal's hepatitis C infection made him unqualified to
work at an oil refinery because the chemicals could damage his liver.265 The
employer claimed that the physical ability to tolerate the chemical environment
was an essential function of the job because the employer's written job
description said S0.266 Most courts would have cited the ADA's provision on
employer deference and accepted the employer's characterization of physical
tolerance as an essential job function. The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, was
among the first to see the absurdity of such an approach. "According to [the
employer]," the Ninth Circuit explained, "the 'requirement' of the job
description that an employee not be susceptible to harm from the chemicals is
an 'essential function' of the job simply because [the employer] has chosen to
describe it as such. 2 67 "[A]n employer may not turn every condition of
descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The
consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms
of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents
in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Id.
261. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004) (stating that "the list is not
exhaustive," that "other relevant evidence may also be presented," and that "[g]reater weight will
not be granted to the types of evidence included on the list than to the types of evidence not
listed"); see also EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 11-14 (explaining that the list of factors for
determining whether a function is essential in the ADA regulations "is not all-inclusive, and
factors not on the list may be equally important as evidence").
262. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 11-14 (explaining that the employer's assessment
was intended only as "a factor to be considered along with other relevant evidence").
263. Id.atII-15.
264. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds, 536 U.S. 73, 76 n.1 (2002).
265. Id. at 1065.
266. Id. at 1070-71.
267. Id.
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employment which it elects to adopt into a job function, let alone an essential
function," held the court, "merely by including it in a job description.
2 68
The significance of this holding is the court's implicit recognition that the
essential nature of a job has an objective existence independent from an
employer's definition. "Job functions," held the court, "are those acts or actions
that constitute a part of the performance of the job. 2 69 In the job of "plant
helper" in an oil refinery, which was at issue in the case, the job functions were
the specific actions that the worker must take "to keep the coker unit
running. 70 "Were we to ignore the limits of the actual functions of the job at
issue and permit [the employer] to add to those functions any condition it
chooses to impose in its written job description, the term 'essential function'
would be rendered meaningless," concluded the court. 7'
Unfortunately, of the few courts that have made this important recognition,
most have responded only by taking one of two small, and ultimately
inadequate, steps toward achieving the ADA's transformative goals. The first
step has been to recharacterize the essential function determination as a
question of fact, rather than a question of law, thus allowing a jury to decide
whether a disputed function is really necessary or not, rather than simply taking
an employer's word for it. The dissent in Davis v. Microsoft Corp.
272
recommended this position when critiquing the majority's dismissal of Thomas
Davis's request to accommodate his hepatitis C infection by modifying the
sixty- to eighty-hour workweek for systems engineers.273 "The majority has
confused 'work load' with 'essential function,"' the dissent explained, taking
268. Id. at 1071; see also Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318,329 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that an employer must produce more than its "own ipse dixit" to establish the
essential nature of a disputed job function, and concluding that "desire that a manager set a good
example" was insufficient to support a rigid start-time as an essential function of a manager's
job); Ragusa v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n--Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Inc., No. 96 Civ.
3127 (JSM), 1998 WL 483461, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1998) (rejecting the employer's
assertion that uninterrupted attendance was an essential function of a service representative's
job based solely on a handbook statement that absenteeism may result in termination, and




271. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision on other
grounds, holding that the case should be decided under 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000), which
allows employers to require "that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace," and which could be extended to require that an
individual's disability not pose a threat to that individual's own personal health. Chevron USA,
Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78-79 (2002).
272. Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 70 F.3d 126 (Wash. 2003).
273. Id. at 140 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
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issue with the majority's unquestioning acceptance of an employer's own
characterization of the essential job functions.2 74 "To allow employers as a
matter of law to define such heavy work loads to be an 'essential function' of
the job," said the dissent, "would eviscerate our statutory protection of disabled
employees. ,,275
Although this dissent correctly identified that a "structural requirement" is
distinguishable from a "task," the dissent failed to see the full import of this
distinction by recognizing that structural requirements are not functions at all,
which would force these cases to reach the undue hardship stage.276 Like the
majority, the dissent assumed that default employment structures are indeed
functions to begin with,277 rather than malleable choices about how to organize
the actual functions of the job. The dissent disagreed only with whom should
decide whether these so-called functions are essential or not. While the
majority would accept the employer's characterization of structural
requirements as essential job functions, the dissent argued that "whether a 60 to
80 hour work week is an essential function of this job is a question of fact, best
left to the jury.
2 78
The dissent's view is more consistent with the statute's integrative goals
than the majority's view, and it certainly would be a step forward by allowing
more ADA cases to receive a trial on the merits. Unlike the majority, the
dissent recognized that default organizational structures are malleable rather
than given, are therefore open to question, and thus require some demonstrable
defense above and beyond the mere fact of tradition. "[A]n employer's
'culture' of requiring long hours of employment, standing alone, is never an
essential element of a job," explained the dissent; "[t]he long hours must be
related to specific requirements of the work performed, not the other way
around." 279 Accordingly, the dissent's position at least would require a trier of
fact to assess the employer's particular need for the default employment
structure. In the case of Microsoft engineers, for example, the trier of fact
would have to assess "whether the employer is merely asking its employee to do
274. Id. (Chambers, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Chambers, J., dissenting); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004)
("Whether a particular function is essential is a factual determination that must be made on a
case by case basis.").
276. See Davis, 70 P.3d at 140, 142 (Chambers, J., dissenting) (distinguishing "a structural
requirement, like a regular workweek of 60 to 80 hours" from "a task," but concluding that the
two categories just need a different test to decide when they are essential functions, rather than
concluding that only tasks are functions).
277. Id. at 141 & n.2 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 140-41 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 141 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
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the work of two people or whether factors such as fluctuations in work load,
travel, the need for on call availability, and other similar factors require
consistent long hours.
280
While this approach makes sense when job tasks are at issue, it does not
fulfill the ADA's objectives when structural requirements-non-functions-are
involved. The fact-based inquiry of courts that have adopted the approach of
the Davis dissent still houses the debate over default work structures within the
plaintiffs prima facie case as part of determining whether the plaintiff falls
within the ADA's protected class. That undermines the ADA's goal of
integrating individuals with disabilities into the mainstream labor market by
forcing the "qualified individual" concept to do too much work: by requiring
employees to demonstrate not only their ability to perform the required job
tasks, but also to perform those tasks in precisely the manner that the employer
desires, before they can seek out the statute's substantive protections. This
approach is at odds with the central purpose of the reasonable accommodation
mandate, which is to re-examine the conventional manner in which work has
been done in order to enable individuals with disabilities to perform, based on
an individualized, case-by-case assessment of abilities and legitimate job
demands.
The second small but imperfect step forward that some courts have taken
is to shift the burden of proof for what constitutes an essential job function
from the employee to the employer whenever a function's necessity is in
dispute. 2 ' Traditionally, courts have held that because the employee mustprove that he or she is a "qualified individual," which is defined as someone
280. Id. (Chambers, J., dissenting). Recharacterizing the essential function determination
as a question of fact also helped the plaintiff get to trial in EEOC v. AICSec. Investigation, Ltd.,
820 F. Supp. 1060, 1060-64 (N.D. Ill. 1 993), rev"d in part on other grounds, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th
Cir. 1995), when the case otherwise would have been dismissed. Rather than accepting the
employer's contention that "regular, predictable, full-time attendance was an essential function"
of an executive director's job, which would have rendered the plaintiff unqualified due to
cancer-related absences, the court held that the need for regular attendance was "a fact intensive
determination," and the court allowed the case to go to trial. Id. at 1063-64; see also Labrecque
v. Sodexho USA, Inc., No. CIV.A.02-30020-MAP, 2003 WL 22389813, at *8 (D. Mass. Oct.
17, 2003) (denying an employer's summaryjudgment motion on the plaintiff's claim for failure
to accommodate her fibromyalgia by allowing her to perform her supervisor/cashier position in
regular eight hour shifts because there was "no indication that such lengthy shifts were essential
functions of the job"); James v. Trs. of Colum. Univ., 15 AD Cases (BNA) 186, 189-90
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that determining essential functions is a factual inquiry and denying
summaryjudgment to the employer on the plaintiff's claim for failure to accommodate her lupus
by modifying the daily schedule for a departmental administrator).
281. See Shestak v. SSA, 84 M.S.P.R. 307, 311 (1999) (noting that courts have split on
whether the employee or the employer has the burden of proving what constitutes an essential
function of ajob).
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who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation, the employee bears the burden of proving that a particular
function is nonessential if the employee is unable to perform it.282 Some courts
have moved away from this traditional view and instead require the employer to
prove the essential nature of a job function when an employee challenges
whether the function really is required.283 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has
held that "if a disabled individual is challenging a particular job requirement as
unessential, the employer will bear the burden of proving that the challenged
criterion is necessary.,
284
While this shift appropriately recognizes that the essential nature of a job
function is not a given and that the employer is in the better position to identify
evidence of the need for a particular function,285 this shift is unlikely to advance
the ADA's transformative goals in a meaningful way. Most of these courts
have set the employer's evidentiary hurdle extremely low by allowing the
employer to meet its burden with self-serving job descriptions or simply with
evidence that both current and past employees have performed the work in a
286similar fashion. More importantly, merely changing who has the burden of
282. See, e.g., Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 18 (lst Cir. 1998)
(applying the traditional burden approach); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131,
137-38 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Hemandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 131 n.6 (D.
Conn. 1997) (same).
283. See, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712(8th Cir. 2003)
("[l]f the employer disputes that the employee can perform the essential functions of the job,
then the burden shifts to the employer to put on some evidence of those essential functions.")
(internal quotation omitted); Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29,34-37 (1 st
Cir. 2000) (placing the burden on the employer to show that an inflexible work schedule was an
essential function of a data entry assistant job); Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 165 F.3d
426, 429 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[i]f the employee challenges a purported job criterion as
not essential and seeks its elimination, the burden then shifts to the employer" to prove that the
function is really required); Sprague v. United Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-12102-GAO, 2002
WL 1803733, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2002) (holding that the employer "bears the burden of
proving that any given job function is essential").
284. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1182 n.8, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996).
285. See Fenney, 327 F.3d at 712 (justifying the burden shift because "much of the
information which determines those essential functions lies uniquely with the employer")
(internal quotation omitted); Ward, 209 F.3d at 35 (holding that the employer "has better access
to the relevant evidence" and therefore should bear the burden of proving that ajob function is
essential); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 1995) (justifying a
burden shift because the employer has unique access to the relevant information); Sprague,
2002 WL 1803733, at *1 (holding that the employer "bears the burden of proving that any given
job function is essential" because the employer "has better access to the relevant evidence").
286. See, e.g., Dropinski v. Douglas County, Neb., 298 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002)
(placing the burden on the employer to show that a disputed function is essential, but allowing
this burden to be met based on "the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential,"
"written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job," and
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proving that a particular function is essential fails to recognize that many of the
exclusionary default elements of the full-time face-time norm are not really
functions at all. A burden-shifting approach on the essential functions
assessment is thus inappropriate because it continues to accept the existing
framework that analyzes challenges to default employment structures as part of
the prima facie determination of a plaintiff's protected status.
Transforming the workplace by eliminating unnecessary default structures
requires a more profound shift that recognizes these structures as malleable
ways to organize the actual job functions and assesses the viability of
alternative organizational schemes as part of the employer's undue hardship
defense. Statutory constructions that merely tinker with who gets to decide or
who has the burden of proof on the essential or nonessential nature of a
particular job function are insufficient. Though they help address the problem
of courts giving employers absolute deference in determining which functions
are and are not essential, they do not address the more fundamental problem of
allowing employers absolute deference in transforming organizational norms
into functions in the first place. Placing the burden on the employer to show
why modifying a default structure would be too difficult would align the
statutory structure with the ADA's integrative goal. If the employee can
perform the specific, required job tasks, the employee should be deemed
qualified, triggering a presumption that the workplace can be restructured to
allow the employee to perform, unless the employer provides a compelling
reason otherwise. Under this alternative approach, integration becomes the
default unless proven otherwise by the employer, rather than the other way
around.
This alternative approach finds support not only in the ADA's general
transformative objectives but also in the statutory text and administrative
guidance. Although the statute supports some deference to the employer when
assessing which job functions are or are not essential, the statute does not
extend that deference when assessing the threshold question of whether an
organizational norm is or is not a function. The statute does not define what
aspects of a job constitute functions, but the statute authorizes the EEOC to
"the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs"); Heaser v. Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826,
831 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 680-81 (8th Cir.
2001) (same). But see Sprague, 2002 WL 1803733, at *2 (shifting the burden to the employer
to show that a disputed function is essential and holding that "the employer's good faith
judgment as to what job functions are essential is not dispositive when other factors do not
support thatjudgment," in order to "ensure that an employer's asserted requirements are solidly
anchored in the realities of the workplace, not constructed out of whole cloth") (internal
quotations omitted).
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issue implementing regulations,28 7 which the EEOC has provided, along with
interpretive guidance, a technical assistance manual, and several enforcement
guides. These sources indicate that job functions refer to discrete tasks, rather
than to conditions of employment regarding when, where, and how discrete
tasks are performed.288 Accordingly, such default organizational structures
should not be used to disqualify disabled individuals from ADA protection.
This position is illustrated in the many examples of job functions that the
EEOC provides. These examples include such things as typing,2 9 proofreading
documents, g° operating a cash register, 29 1 receiving money and making
292 293change, putting items into bags and giving the bags to customers, carrying
a person out of a burning building, 294 landing a plane,295 inspecting
identification cards,296 answering the telephone,297 filing and retrieving written
materials, 298 developing programs, 299 reading temperature and pressure gauges
and adjusting machine controls, 30° accessing, inputting, and retrieving
information from a computer,3° 1 and communicating fluently in Japanese.3 °2
All of these examples indicate that default organizational structures regarding
the full-time face-time norm should not be treated as essential functions that
287. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000).
288. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004) (using the word "task" when
discussing what constitutes ajob function); see also Smith, supra note 152, at 169 (arguing that
the ADA's essential function concept "contemplates tasks, not the ethereal concept of
'presence"').
289. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004); see also EEOC MANUAL, supra note
231, at 11-13 (describing the job functions of a secretary or receptionist).
290. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004); see also EEOC MANUAL, supra note
231, at 11-13 (describing the job functions of a secretary or receptionist).
291. 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004).
292. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 11- 18 (describing the job functions of a grocery
store clerk).
293. Id. at 11-18 to 11-19 (describing the job functions of a grocery store bagger).
294. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2004) (describing the job functions of a
firefighter); see also EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at II-17 (same).
295. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at II-17 (describing the job functions of a pilot).
296. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (describing the job functions of a security
guard).
297. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 11-14 (describing the job functions of a file clerk);
id. at 11-17 (describing the job functions of a clerical worker).
298. Id. at 11-14 (describing the job functions of a file clerk).
299. Id. at 11-21 (describing the job functions of a computer programmer).
300. Id. at 11-16.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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303disqualify disabled individuals from ADA coverage. Default organizational
structures simply do not meet the threshold definition of a function, essential or
otherwise. 3°
Additional support for this view is found in the EEOC's Technical
Assistance Manual, which illustrates the process of breaking down a secretarial
job into its constituent "functions," to assist courts and employers in this
endeavor.30 5 According to the EEOC's Manual, the job functions of a secretary
might include:
(1) transcribing dictation and written drafts from the supervisor and other
staff into final written documents; (2) proof-reading documents for
accuracy; (3) developing and maintaining files; (4) scheduling and making
arrangements for meetings and conferences; (5) logging documents and
correspondence in and out; (6) placing, answering, and referring telephone
calls; (7) distributing documents to appropriate staff members;
(8) reproducing documents on copying machines; and (9) occasional travel
to perform clerical tasks at out of town conferences.0 6
Conspicuously absent from this list ofjob functions are requirements regarding
the when, where, or how of everyday job performance.
The EEOC's interpretive materials are quite explicit on this point with
respect to at least one aspect of the full-time face-time norm: an employer's
demand for rigid daily attendance. The EEOC's guidance notes that "[c]ertain
courts have characterized attendance as an 'essential function,"' but the EEOC
concludes that such a characterization is "inconsistent" with the ADA's
303. Cf Smith, supra note 152, at 181 (noting that the ADA's legislative history "does not
mention attendance in its discussions ofjob qualifications," but instead focuses on "necessary
technical skills, such as typing speed," and arguing that courts should focus on such skills
"when determining whether a plaintiff is a 'qualified individual"') (citing H.R. REP. No. 485,
101ST CONG., 2D SESS., pt. 2, 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348).
304. The EEOC's guidance on how to determine whether a particular function is essential
also implies that the term "function" refers only to discrete tasks and skills. The EEOC explains
that a function may be deemed "essential," rather than "marginal," if: (1) "the reason the
position exists is to perform that function," (2) there are a "limited number of employees
available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed," or (3) the
function is "highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her
expertise or ability to perform the particular function." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2004). The
EEOC further states that assessing whether a function is essential should focus on the function's
"importance" in achieving the job's purpose, which requires "consideration of the frequency
with which a function is performed, the amount of time spent on the function, and the
consequences if the function is not performed." EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 11-20.
These tests for deciding whether a function is essential or marginal would not make sense for
default organizational structures regarding the full-time face-time norm.
305. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at V-12, V-13.
306. Id.
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regulations.30 7 According to the EEOC, "[a]ttendance... is not an essential
function as defined by the ADA" because essential functions refer only to
"duties to be performed. 30 0 If a modified work schedule has any negative
effect on the employer, the EEOC instructs courts to assess that effect under the
employer's undue hardship defense rather than treating the default schedule as
an essential function that disqualifies all disabled individuals who request
scheduling flexibility.
3 9
The EEOC took the same position with regard to overtime requirements in
an amicus brief to the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Florida Power & Light
Co. 310 In Davis, the EEOC supported the employee's request to accommodate
his back injury by modifying the employer's mandatory overtime policy.
31'
The EEOC argued that a job "function" should be interpreted as a job "task,"
and that the employee was a qualified individual because he could perform all
of the job's required tasks with the reasonable accommodation of limiting
mandatory overtime.312 The EEOC concluded that because "overtime is not a
task to be performed," working overtime could never be deemed an essential
function of a job.313 Under this view, any negative impact on the employer
307. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22 n.65
(superceding EEOC Guidance issued Mar. 1, 1999) (citing Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530
(D.C. Cir. 1994), and Jackson v. Dep't of Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-79 (11 th Cir.
1994)).
308. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22 n.65
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1997)); see also Passamano, supra note 140, at 868-71 (arguing
that the presumption that regular and predictable attendance is an essential job function is
contrary to the ADA, its legislative history, and the EEOC regulations). The EEOC took a
similar position in its 1999 Enforcement Guidance, which was superceded by the 2002 version
quoted herein. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 16 n.61 (Mar. 1, 1999).
309. See EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22 n.65
("[I]f the time during which an essential function is performed is integral to its successful
completion, then an employer may deny a request to modify an employee's schedule as an
undue hardship."). But see EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 11-13 (indicating that "the ability
to work at any time of day" would be considered an essential function for a "'floating'
supervisor" who is hired to substitute when supervisors on the day, night, or graveyard shifts are
absent, rather than concluding that any modification to the "work at any time of day"
requirement would constitute an undue hardship for the employer).
310. Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1306 & n.7 (I th Cir. 2000) (citing
but rejecting the EEOC's amicus argument).
311. See id. (noting the EEOC's assertion that overtime "can never be an 'essential
function' of a job").
312. See id. (describing the EEOC's position); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
§ 1630.2(n) (2004) (using the word "task" to describe ajob function).
313. See Davis, 205 F.3d at 1306 & n.7 (citing but rejecting the EEOC's amicus
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from modifying its overtime policy would be assessed under the employer's
undue hardship defense, instead of being used to disqualify the employee from
ADA protection.
Treating default organizational structures as non-functions finds further
support in the way that both the statute and the administrative materials define
the ADA's reasonable accommodation obligation. The concepts of "essential
functions" and "reasonable accommodations" are intertwined. The ADA's
accommodation duty only applies when a disabled employee is a "qualified
individual," which is defined to require the employee to be able to perform all
of the essential job functions, "with or without a reasonable accommodation."
In other words, a workplace modification only constitutes a reasonable
accommodation if it allows an employee to perform the job's essential
functions. If a workplace modification eliminates an essential function, then it
does not meet the definition of a reasonable accommodation.3 14 What is
significant about both the statute and the administrative materials is that they
both define "reasonable accommodations" to include a wide variety of
modifications to default organizational structures regarding when, where, and
how work is performed. Those default organizational structures cannot,
therefore, constitute essential functions of a job. If default organizational
structures regarding the full-time face-time norm constituted essential job
functions, then modifications to those default structures would not be used as
examples of reasonable accommodations by Congress or the EEOC.
One of the most compelling examples of this point is the fact that the
statute, the regulations, and the EEOC's guidance documents all define
reasonable accommodations to include "part-time or modified work schedules"
and "other similar accommodations.""3 ' According to the EEOC, the
workplace barriers that the accommodation mandate is intended to alleviate
include, among other things, "rigid work schedules that permit no flexibility as
argument).
314. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (explaining that an employer "is not
required to reallocate essential functions," which are "by definition those that the individual who
holds the job would have to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, in order to be
considered qualified for the position").
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B) (2000); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2004);
see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22-23
(suggesting a modified or part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation); EEOC MANUAL,
supra note 23 1, at 111-5 (same); EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, 23, 25 (Mar. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EEOC
GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES] (same); EEOC GUIDANCEON QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS,
supra note 226, l(A)(2), I(B)(3) (same).
RECAPTURING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL
to when work is performed or when breaks may be taken. 3 16 Thus, the EEOC
interprets the statute's accommodation definition to encompass a wide variety
of flexible timing arrangements, such as "adjusting arrival or departure
times,"'317 "providing periodic breaks,"3 8 "altering when certain functions are
performed,"319 and allowing "flexibility in work hours or the work week, or
part-time work. 3 20 If either Congress or the EEOC had intended full-time
316. 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2004); see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, "Reasonable Accommodation" (noting that
accommodations "remove workplace barriers," including "procedures or rules (such as rules
concerning when work is performed [or] when breaks are taken)").
317. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22 (explaining
that an employer would be required to accommodate a day care worker's disability by allowing
her "to change her hours from 7:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m.," as long as there
would still be sufficient morning coverage); see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES, supra note 315, 23 (noting that "[s]ome medications taken for psychiatric
disabilities cause extreme grogginess and lack of concentration in the morning," and that a
reasonable accommodation would be to allow the individual "to change his/her regularly
scheduled working hours, for example, to work 10 AM to 6 PM rather than 9 AM to 5 PM"); id.
31 (explaining that if "[a]n employee with major depression is often late for work because of
medication side-effects that make him extremely groggy in the morning," then a reasonable
accommodation "would be to modify his schedule so that he is not required to report for work
until 10:00 AM"); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-23 (noting that "[p]eople whose
disabilities may need modified work schedules include.., people with mobility and other
impairments who find it difficult to use public transportation during peak hours, or who must
depend upon special para-transit schedules").
318. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22; see also
EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-23 (noting that "[p]eople whose disabilities may need
modified work schedules include ... people who need rest periods (including some people who
have multiple sclerosis, cancer, diabetes, respiratory conditions, or mental illness)").
319. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 23 1, 22; see also
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (noting that "an essential function customarily
performed in the early morning hours may be rescheduled until later in the day as a reasonable
accommodation to a disability that precludes performance of the function at the customary
hour"); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-22 (explaining that "[a]n essential function that is
usually performed in the early morning might be rescheduled to be performed later in the day,"
if a person's disability "makes it impossible to perform this function in the morning").
320. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-22. The EEOC notes that "[p]eople whose
disabilities may need modified work schedules include those who require special medical
treatment for their disability (such as cancer patients, people who have AIDS, or people with
mental illness)" and "people whose disabilities (such as diabetes) are affected by eating or
sleeping schedules." Id. The EEOC explains that accommodations for such individuals could
include modifications to "a standard 9-5 work day, or a standard Monday to Friday work week,"
or to other regular schedules. Id. The EEOC provides several specific examples. Id. For an
individual with a mental disability, the EEOC suggests that accommodation could include
providing "two hours off, twice weekly, for sessions with a psychiatrist," by permitting the
employee "to take longer lunch breaks and to make up the time by working later on those days."
Id. For an individual with diabetes, the EEOC suggests that accommodation could include
assigning the employee to "one shift on a permanent basis," rather than to "normal shift
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work or rigid daily schedules to constitute "essential job functions," then they
would not have listed these forms of "part-time or modified work schedules" as
reasonable accommodations, which, by definition, may not eliminate an
essential function of the job.32'
Of course, both Congress and the EEOC recognized that modifying full-
time or daily work schedules sometimes may affect workplace operations. That
fact, however, does not transform a default scheduling requirement into a
function, much less an "essential" one. Instead, the EEOC advises that any
such impact be assessed under the employer's undue hardship defense.322
Specifically, the EEOC suggests that "[e]mployers should carefully assess
whether modifying the hours could significantly disrupt their operations-that
is, cause undue hardship--or whether the essential functions may be performed
at different times with little or no impact on the operations or the ability of
other employees to perform their jobs.
3 23
rotations," which interfere with the employee's strict eating and insulin needs. Id. And for an
individual who needs kidney dialysis two weekdays per week, the EEOC suggests that one
accommodation would be "for him to work Saturday and Sunday in place of the two weekdays,
to perform work assignments at home on the weekend, or to work three days a week as [a] part-
time employee." Id.
321. See Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2000)
(explaining that an inflexible work schedule was not an essential function of a data entry
assistant position in part because the ADA lists "part-time or modified work schedules" as an
example of a reasonable accommodation).
322. See EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 23
("Under the ADA, an employee who needs a modified or part-time schedule because of his/her
disability is entitled to such a schedule if there is no other effective accommodation and it will
not cause undue hardship."); see also id. 22 (explaining that an employer must "allow an
employee with a disability to work a modified or part-time schedule as a reasonable
accommodation, absent undue hardship"); id. 43 (explaining that an employer need not modify
a disabled individual's work hours "if doing so would prevent other employees from performing
their jobs," not because the rigid work schedule is an essential function, but because the
disruption is "an undue hardship"); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-22 ("An employer
should consider modification of a regular work schedule as a reasonable accommodation unless
this would cause an undue hardship."); id. at 111-21 (explaining that an employer would be
required to reschedule the timing of various tasks to accommodate a disability, if the
rescheduling "would not cause an undue hardship"); EEOC GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES, supra note 315, 25 (noting that "an adjusted work schedule" would constitute a
reasonable accommodation as long as it did not create an undue hardship); id. 23 (explaining
that, "barring undue hardship," an employer must accommodate psychiatric disabilities in which
medication affects morning performance by giving the employee "a later schedule"); id. 31
(explaining that, "barring undue hardship," an employer must provide a later start-time for "[a]n
employee with major depression who is often late to work because of medication side-effects").
323. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 22 (emphasis
added).
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The EEOC illustrates this point using an example of a disabled employee
who operates a printing press for a morning newspaper from ten o'clock p.m. to
three o'clock a.m. 324 The EEOC concludes that the employee would not
receive a modified schedule as an accommodation. 25 According to the EEOC,
this result is not because the existing schedule constitutes an essential function
of the job; rather, it is because a modified schedule would impose an "undue
hardship" on the employer. 26 Under the former approach, the employee's
inability to perform an essential function would render her unqualified and
outside of the ADA's protected class. Under the latter approach, in contrast,
the employee would be deemed "qualified," and the employer would have to
consider other possible accommodations, such as reassignment to an alternative
327vacant position.
A second example that supports the view that default organizational
structures do not constitute "essential functions" involves the default preference
for an uninterrupted worklife. All of the administrative materials interpreting
the statutory definition of "reasonable accommodations" include leaves of
absence as an example.3 28 According to the EEOC, this type of accommodation
may take many forms, such as "allowing an employee to use accrued paid
leave, 329 "providing additional unpaid leave, 330 permitting "advanced
leave, '331 allowing "occasional leave (e.g., a few hours at a time), 3 32 or






329. Id. 7 22; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (describing the use of
accrued leave as an accommodation); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-6, 111-23 (same);
EEOC GUIDANCE ON PSYCIHATRIC DIsABIuTIEs, supra note 315, 23 (same).
330. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 23 1, n 17,22; see
also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (identifying unpaid leave as an
accommodation); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at VII-10 (same); EEOC GUIDANCE ON
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 315, 23 (same); Smith, supra note 152, at 181 (arguing
that the use of unpaid leave to illustrate the accommodation concept in the ADA's legislative
history is evidence that workplace presence should not be treated as an essential job function)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,345)).
331. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at 111-23.
332. EEOC GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 315,1 23.
333. Id. 25; see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note
231, 17 ("Modifying workplace policies, including leave policies, is a form of reasonable
accommodation."); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-23 ("Flexible leave policies should
be considered as a reasonable accommodation when people with disabilities require time off
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demand for an uninterrupted worklife constituted an essential job function, then
none of these types of leaves would have been listed as reasonable
accommodations, which cannot include workplace changes that eliminate
essential functions of a job.
As with part-time work, the EEOC recognizes that leaves of absence
sometimes may have a detrimental effect on the employer's operations. Yet
even in those instances, an employer cannot transform its demand for an
uninterrupted worklife into ajob function-much less an "essential" one-that
could be used to disqualify all employees who require a temporary leave from
the ADA's protection. Again, the EEOC explains that any such effect should
be taken into account when assessing the employer's undue hardship
defense.334
A third example of the EEOC's view that default organizational structures
do not constitute "essential functions" involves the default preference for full-
time presence at a central office. The EEOC has taken the position that
accommodations may include allowing an employee to telecommute or perform
some work from home. 335 This means that full-time office presence cannot
from work because of their disability."); id. at 111-30 (explaining that "modifications to existing
leave policies ... may be required as accommodations"); id. at 111-10 (listing "modification" of
an "uniformly applied leave policy" as an example of an accommodation); EEOC GUIDANCE ON
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 315, 25 (explaining that "it would be a reasonable
accommodation to modify a policy requiring employees to schedule vacation time in advance,"
if a disabled worker "needed to use accrued vacation time on an unscheduled basis").
334. See EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 43
(explaining that an employer would not be required to grant a leave to accommodate a disability
if the leave would "prevent other employees from doing their jobs," not because the demand for
uninterrupted presence constitutes an essential job function, but because the disruption
"constitutes an undue hardship"); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-23 (explaining that an
employer "should consider allowing use of accrued leave, advanced leave, or leave without pay,
where this will not cause an undue hardship"); id. at 111-10 (noting that an employer must
provide a "modification" of a "uniformly applied leave policy" as a reasonable accommodation,
"unless it would impose an undue hardship"); EEOC GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES,
supra note 315, 23 ("Permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid
leave for treatment or recovery related to a disability is a reasonable accommodation, unless (or
until) the employee's absence imposes an undue hardship."); id. 25 (explaining that "barring
undue hardship," reasonable accommodation will include modifying workplace leave policies or
providing additional unpaid leave).
335. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 34; see also
EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-23 (explaining that one accommodation for an employee
who needs kidney dialysis on two weekdays per week would be to allow the employee "to
perform work assignments at home on the weekend"); EEOC, Work at Home/Telework as a
Reasonable Accommodation, at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/telework.htm (last modified Feb. 3,
2003) (stating that telecommuting may be a reasonable accommodation "even if the employer
does not allow other employees to telework") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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constitute an essential function of the job that automatically disqualifies all
disabled workers who require some locational flexibility. The EEOC
recognizes that telecommuting only will be an effective accommodation when it
allows an employee to continue performing the actual essential job functions,
which is likely to occur in such jobs as telemarketing and proofreading, but not
for food servers, store cashiers, or other similar positions.336 Again, the EEOC
instructs that any impact on the employer from allowing a disabled worker to
perform tasks from home should be assessed under the employer's undue
hardship defense.337
The statutory language and regulations defining undue hardship are
similarly inconsistent with treating default organizational structures as essential
functions of ajob. The undue hardship defense is the portion of the statute that
directs courts to assess the impact that job modifications will have on an
employer. The statute and regulations list several factors to consider, including
the nature and cost of the accommodation, its impact on business operations,
and the employer's size, structure, and financial resources.338 Undue hardship
is not limited to financial difficulty, but also applies to an accommodation that
is "unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would
fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business. 3 39 When courts
assume that default organizational structures are essential to the job, courts
implicitly are making unsubstantiated judgments about the impact that
modifying these structures might have on the employer. According to the
statute, such judgments should be made explicitly, and only if the employer
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that an alternative structure would
cause "significant difficulty or expense.
3 40
It may be surprising that so many courts have continued to view the ADA
through the lens of workplace essentialism even in the face of such strong
authority to the contrary. The Supreme Court likely has made it easier for
336. See EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 34 (giving
examples ofjobs in which telecommuting would not be a viable accommodation).
337. Id.
338. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) (2000); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §§ 1630.2(p)(1) & (2)
(2004); see also EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111- 12, 111-16 (listing factors for assessing
undue hardship); EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 23 1,
"Undue Hardship" (same).
339. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630. 2(p) (2004); see also id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(d)
(explaining the undue hardship defense); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 23 1, at 111-12 (same).
340. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) (2000). The regulations explain, for example, that the
ADA would require an employer to make an exception to a "no-leave policy" and grant a leave
of absence to accommodate a disability, "unless the provision of leave would impose an undue
hardship." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.15(b) & (c) (2004).
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judges to resist recognizing and questioning their own assumptions about the
nature of the existing workplace design, in part by remaining deliberately
ambiguous over the level of deference commanded by various portions of the
ADA's regulations and interpretative guidance, 34' and in part by being willing
to interpret the ADA at odds with the EEOC's position in other contexts.
342
Nevertheless, a few courts have analyzed accommodation claims challenging
the full-time face-time norm consistent with the statute's transformative vision,
and those opinions should become models for interpreting the ADA.
In Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass 'n,343 for example, the Ninth
Circuit reversed summary judgment for the employer and held that Carolyn
Humphrey had stated an ADA claim.344 Humphrey had asked her employer to
accommodate her obsessive compulsive disorder by allowing her to perform her
medical transcriptionist job from home because she was unable to arrive at the
central work site at a specified time.345 The employer argued that Humphrey's
341. The ADA contains a set of generally applicable sections, in addition to five separate
titles governing different aspects of civic life, such as employment, transportation, and public
accommodations. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (discussing
the ADA's structure). In Sutton, the Court accurately observed that the ADA split the authority
to issue regulations for the various titles among three agencies, with the EEOC having authority
to implement the employment provisions in Title I. Id. at 478-79. Over Justice Breyer's
dissent, id. at 513-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting), the Court concluded that the ADA technically had
not authorized any of the agencies to issue regulations implementing the ADA's generally
applicable provisions, which include the definition of who constitutes a disabled individual. Id.
at 479. While implying that an agency's regulations regarding the generally applicable
definition sections were not subject to Chevron deference, the Court found no need to decide
what level of reduced deference, if any, was due. Id. at 480; see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) (observing that because "no agency has been given
authority to issue regulations interpreting the term 'disability' in the ADA," the "persuasive
authority" of the EEOC definitional regulations is unclear, but finding "no occasion to decide
what level of deference, if any, they are due"); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,
563 n. 10 (1999) (explaining that because "the parties have not questioned the regulations and
interpretive guidance promulgated by the EEOC relating to the ADA's definition section," the
Court had "no occasion to decide what level of deference, if any, they are due"); cf Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (indicating that the EEOC's regulations on
the "direct threat" defense would be subject to Chevron deference). The Sutton Court also
declined to decide what deference, if any, was due to the EEOC's other materials, such as the
Interpretive Guidance appended to the EEOC's formal regulations. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480.
342. See, e.g., id. at 481-82 (holding that an individual's disability status should be
assessed by considering how the individual functions with all mitigating or corrective measures
that the individual has adopted, which was at odds with the EEOC's position in 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app. § 1630.2(j) that disability status should be assessed in an individual's unmitigated
state).
343. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n., 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
344. Id. at 1140.
345. Id. at 130-33. The employer had fired the plaintiff for tardiness and absenteeism
allegedly caused by her disability after the employer's use of a flexible start-time was
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disability "render[ed] her not otherwise qualified under the ADA because
regular and predictable attendance is an essential function of the position."
' 346
The Ninth Circuit rejected the employer's argument and held that "physical
attendance at the [employer's] offices is not.an essential job duty. 3 47 The court
instead focused on Humphrey's ability to perform the actual tasks of a medical
transcriptionist, including typing quickly and accurately, understanding and
transcribing comments from doctors with a variety of accents, and meeting
necessary deadlines. 48 Because there was evidence that Humphrey could
perform all of these tasks from home, the court concluded that her request "to
become a 'home-based transcriptionist"' was a viable accommodation, rather
than an impermissible request to eliminate an essential function of the job.349
The Ninth Circuit also concluded correctly that any potential impact on the
employer from modifying the default full-time face-time requirement should be
assessed under the employer's undue hardship defense. 350 The court noted that
the defense would fail because the employer had made no showing of difficulty
from allowing a medical transcriptionist to work from home.35 1 That finding
illustrates the significance of using the correct analysis for default
organizational structures. If the court had used the more typical analysis that
unquestioningly accepts the employer's characterization of office presence as
an essential function of the job, Humphrey would have been excluded from the
ADA's protected class altogether. Her request to work from home would have
been characterized as a demand to eliminate an essential function-an
impermissible form of accommodation-which means that she would have
been considered unqualified for the job. The court would have dismissed her
claim for failure to state a prima facie case, and the employer could have
retained its default job structure even though there was no justification for the
exclusionary workplace design in such a location-independent job.
The D.C. Circuit demonstrated similar clarity when it reversed a grant of
summary judgment for the employer in Langon v. Department of Health and
unsuccessful. Id. at 131-33.
346. Id. at 1135.
347. Id. at 1136-37; see also id. at 1135 n. 11 (explaining that "regular and predictable
attendance is not per se an essential function of all jobs").
348. Id. at 132-37.
349. See id. at 1135-37 (finding a triable issue on the plaintiff's ADA accommodation
claim); see also Anzalone v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 93-2248, 1995 WL 21672, at *3-4
(E.D. La. Jan. 19, 1995) (denying an employer's summaryjudgment motion on the plaintiff's
claim for failure to accommodate his back injury by allowing him to perform his claims adjuster
job from home).
350. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1126, 1136 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2001).
351. Id.
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Human Services.352 The employer had denied Patricia Langon's request to
perform her computer programmer job from home to accommodate her
multiple sclerosis. 3 53  The district court had accepted the employer's
unsubstantiated contention that the position did not "lend itself to working at
home," which meant that Langon was not a "qualified individual" because she
could not perform an essential function of the job.354 The D.C. Circuit took the
lower court to task for focusing on the plaintiff's protected status, rather than
on the employer's undue hardship defense.355 Because at most the record
indicated that telecommuting "would create some difficulty for the [employer],
not that it would impose... an 'undue hardship,"' the D.C. Circuit
appropriately allowed the case to go to trial.356 Once again, the practical
difference between the typical analysis by the district court and the correct
analysis by the appellate court is clear. Under the district court's
characterization of full-time office presence as an essential job function, the
plaintiff is defined out of the ADA's protected class and the employer is
allowed to retain its default exclusionary structure, even when changing that
structure would have a negligible effect on the employer.
There are isolated instances of the correct analysis in cases involving other
aspects of the full-time face-time norm as well, including the default preference
for an uninterrupted worklife. 357 In Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's
Research Center,358 the Sixth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment to
the employer that fired Katherine Cehrs from her nursing job after she
352. Langon v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(ruling under the ADA's predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act).
353. Id. at 1055-56.
354. Id. at 1060-61.
355. See id. (explaining the proper analysis for the undue hardship defense).
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437,439-41,443 (lst Cir. 1998) (upholding
a jury verdict on the plaintiff's ADA claim for failure to extend a leave of absence to
accommodate her anxiety disorder and depression because the jury could have deemed her
qualified based on her ability to perform the job tasks of her marketing position before and after
the leave); Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 599-602 (7th Cir. 1998)
(upholding ajury verdict on plaintiff's ADA claim alleging that the plaintiff was "qualified" to
be the Vice President of Finance and finding that a jury could conclude that taking a leave of
absence to recover from lupus would not pose an undue hardship for the employer); Kimbro v.
AtI. Richfield Co. 889 F.2d 869, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing judgment for the employer
on a state law claim alleging that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's
migraines by providing a leave of absence, which the employer did not prove would pose an
undue hardship); see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 23 1,
22 n.65 (citing Haschmann favorably on this point); Passamano, supra note 140, at 883-86
(summarizing cases that correctly treated leaves of absence as accommodations under the ADA).
358. Cehrs v. N.E. Oh. Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998).
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requested a leave of absence to accommodate her psoriasis.3 5 9 The court
refused to characterize an uninterrupted worklife as an essential job function
and held that reasonable accommodations can include leaves of absence. 360
Because the ADA's ultimate goal is to redesign the workplace to integrate
individuals with disabilities into the mainstream labor market, the Sixth Circuit
correctly rejected other courts' presumption of the essential nature of regular
attendance. 361 "The presumption that uninterrupted attendance is an essential
job requirement improperly dispenses with the burden-shifting analysis,"
explained the court, because the employer "never bears the burden of proving
that the accommodation proposed by an employee is unreasonable and imposes
an undue burden upon it."'362  "If an employer cannot show that an
accommodation unduly burdens it," held the court, "then there is no reason to
deny the employee the accommodation.
3 63
The same reasoning applies equally well to the default preference for rigid
full-time work, which several courts have started to recognize in cases
involving requests for part-time work 364 or flexible work schedules.365 In Ward
v. Massachusetts Health Research Institute, Inc.,3  the First Circuit correctly
used the undue hardship defense to analyze the business impact of an
359. Id. at 777-78.
360. See id. at 781-83 (rejecting the argument that regular attendance is per se essential).
361. Id. at 783; see also EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note
231, 22 n.65 (citing Cehrs favorably on this point).
362. Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 782.
363. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 152, at 171, 178 (arguing that courts should require
employers to "show how accommodating a plaintiffs illness and its resultant attendance
problems would impose an undue hardship," rather than holding that absences invalidate the
prima facie case).
364. See, e.g., Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 170 (lst Cir. 1998) (affirming a
preliminary injunction against an employer on the plaintiff's claim that denying a part-time
schedule to accommodate a psychological condition violated the ADA); Valentine v. Am. Home
Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1400 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (denying the employer summary
judgment on the plaintiff's ADA claim by finding a triable issue on whether a part-time
schedule would be a reasonable accommodation for asthma).
365. See, e.g., Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-44, 1151-54 (D.
Minn. 1995) (finding a triable case against an employer that refused to accommodate the
plaintiff by allowing him to use accrued vacation time or flex-time for illness-related absences
and assessing the impact of a modified work schedule under the undue hardship defense); see
also Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 283-84 (11 th Cir. 1994) (Birch, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the essential functions of a housekeeping aide do not include "actual presence"
at designated times and arguing that the plaintiff had a triable claim against his employer for
failing to accommodate absences from rheumatoid arthritis by shifting the timing of
performance).
366. Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000).
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employee's request for a flexible daily work schedule.367 Rather than
concluding that the employee's need for a flexible schedule rendered her
unqualified, the court required the employer to prove "that an open-ended
schedule would be a hardship, financial or otherwise," in order for the employer
to retain its default scheduling design.368
The district court in Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County
369 thsaCommissioners took the same approach when it held that William Dutton
had a triable discrimination claim after his employer fired him from his
equipment operator job and refused to accommodate his migraine-related
absences by allowing him to use vacation time after his sick leave was
exhausted.370 The court did not assume that regular, uninterrupted presence
was an essential function of the job, which would have rendered Dutton
unqualified.371 The court instead focused on whether Dutton could perform the
actual job duties of an equipment operator "when he ispresent" on the job.372
Because Dutton could operate all of the heavy equipment to maintain roads
satisfactorily while he was at work, the court held that he was a qualified
individual within the protected class.373 That allowed the court to reach the
undue hardship stage of analysis, which forced the employer to defend its
exclusionary attendance practice by demonstrating a significant impact from its
modification.374 Because the employer could not establish that allowing Dutton
to use unscheduled vacation time to cover disability-related absences would be
it 375"unduly disruptive," the court refused to dismiss the case.
The district court in Carlson v. InaCom Corp.376 similarly held that Debra
Carlson was qualified for her executive secretary job despite periodic absences
due to migraine headaches.377 The court rejected the employer's argument that
"regular, predictable attendance is an essential requirement of the executive
367. Id. at 33, 35-37.
368. Id. at 37.
369. Dutton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 859 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan. 1994).
370. Id. at 501-05 (ruling on both ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims).
371. See id. at 507-08 (recognizing implicitly that attendance is not ajob function when
noting that "[i]f defendant were willing to accept plaintiff's use of unscheduled leave by
allowing him to use his vacation time, then plaintiff would be able to successfully perform the
essential functions of his job").
372. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
373. Id.
374. See id. at 506-08 (explaining the shifting burdens of an ADA claim).
375. Id. at 508-09 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, app. § 1630.2(p) (2004)).
376. Carlson v. InaCom Corp., 885 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Neb. 1995).
377. Id. at 1315-19, 1322. The court, however, entered judgment for the employer because
the plaintiff failed to prove a different element of her case. Id.
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secretary position," which would have placed Carlson outside of the ADA's
protected class.378 Instead, the court focused on the actual, underlying job
tasks, including "answering the phone, typing, handling mail, making travel
arrangements, processing paperwork, product applications, financial reports,
updating addresses and authorization numbers,... monitoring the timely
completion of franchise tax returns," and "programming phones for
employees," all of which Carlson could perform satisfactorily "when she was at
work. " 379 This allowed the court to reach the undue hardship issue, thus forcing
the employer to defend its exclusionary demand for uninterrupted daily
presence by demonstrating that an alteration would be "unduly disruptive,"
which the employer was unable to do.38°
In all of these cases, the courts correctly placed the burden on the
employer to demonstrate why the conventional workplace could not be altered,
rather than placing the burden on the employee to demonstrate performance
within the conventional design. This is consistent with the ADA's
characterization of "undue hardship" as an affirmative defense,3' and it
removes the analysis of an accommodation's impact from the threshold
determination of which workers are within the ADA's protected class. Instead,
the full-time face-time norm is brought within the reach of antidiscrimination
review, and employers are required to justify the exclusionary aspects of this
norm in order to retain their conventional design.
The result of this new scrutiny is likely to reveal three different sets of
cases. First, there will be cases in which an employee's accommodation
request to alter the full-time face-time norm would not have any negative
impact on the employer, or even may produce positive economic results. These
are cases in which an employer's reliance on workplace essentialism has led to
a rationalization of the existing workplace structure, even at the expense of
strictly "rational" economic behavior. Researchers have documented many
employment situations in which financial gains result when an employer
implements modified work schedules, job sharing or reduced hour options,
telecommuting arrangements, or other flexible work designs. These benefits
include reduced absenteeism and turnover, reduced rehiring and retraining
costs, reduced overhead expenses, increased worker productivity, and enhanced
378. Id. at 1320-21 ("declin[ing] to find that attendance is an essential element").
379. Id. at 1316, 1320 (emphasis added).
380. See id. at 1321 (noting the lack of evidence that the employee's migraine-related
absences "resulted in essential business not being completed in a timely and efficient manner" or
caused any "threatened or actual lost business or profits").
381. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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recruiting.38 2 In these cases, the employee will be able to state a valid ADA
accommodation claim, and the employer will not be able to raise an undue
hardship defense. Unlike under the essentialist approach that would treat the
plaintiffs in these cases as unqualified for ADA protection, the transformative
approach would require the employer to modify the full-time face-time norm.
In this set of cases, the law would be an impetus for the employer to confront its
reliance on workplace essentialism and move in a more economically rational
direction.
Second, there will be cases in which an employee's accommodation
request to alter the full-time face-time norm would impose on the employer
some negative impact, financial or otherwise, at least in the short-term. As long
as this impact does not rise to the level of "undue hardship," the employer
would be required to modify the default workplace design under the
transformative interpretation of the ADA, whereas courts using the essentialist
approach would have defined the employees out of the ADA's protected class
and imposed no such obligation on the employer. While the transformative
approach therefore could impose additional costs on employers in this second
set of cases, the ADA endorses the fact that employers often must bear
significant expense to achieve workplace equality for individuals with
disabilities.383 Moreover, there are reasons to believe that these expenses may
be less than anticipated. Nothing in this approach changes the fact that
382. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 65, 84-85, 88-93 (providing examples of companies
where modified work schedules yielded beneficial results); Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at
382 (explaining that accommodations "can improve worker productivity and future
commitment, particularly in situations involving reductions in work time"); Travis, The Virtual
Workplace, supra note 16, at 364-68, 373 (describing the benefits of telecommuting); see also
Richard Federico, Quantifying the Impacts of Work/Life Programs (June 2002), at http://www.
cupahr.org/newsroom/cupahmews-archives/vol02-6-02/work-life-programs.html (explaining
that researchers have developed methodologies for quantifying the economic impact of flexible
work initiatives, such as measuring the employer's return on investment through the increased
retention rate of new mothers who are allowed to telecommute) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Lotte Bailyn 's Prescription for Business: Linking Personal Life and
Work Can Revitalize Companies, at http://web.archive.org/web/20000310035335/http://
mitsloan.mit.edu/roi/summer97/life work.html (last updated June 19, 1997) (describing a multi-
year study at Xerox where financial gains resulted from reorganizing worksites to integrate work
and family) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). There is also a growing
industry of consulting firms that promise to design cost-effective flexible work arrangements.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 85 (naming work/family consulting groups); Travis, The
Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 373 (detailing companies that offer family-friendly
workplace consulting).
383. See 29 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2000) (requiring employers to provide
accommodations if they pose anything less than "significant" expense); see also Schwab &
Willbom, supra note 172, at 1200, 1204, 1211-12, 1228 (explaining the costs imposed by the
ADA's accommodation obligation).
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employers only need to respond to individuals with known disabilities38 4 and
only need to alter organizational structures for those individuals, not for all
members of their workforce.38 5 Additionally, as long as the employer
demonstrates good faith efforts to accommodate, the employer will not face
punitive damages if a court decides that the employer's conclusion regarding
undue hardship was incorrect and orders the employer to modify the
workplace.3"6 More importantly, even if employers do incur short-term
expenses from redesigning the full-time face-time norm, the ADA's drafters
had the foresight to realize that those expenses are viewed more accurately as
investments, which often will yield a long-term return from the full integration
and self-sufficiency of the individuals with disabilities who currently are
excluded from workplace participation.38 7
There also may exist a third set of cases in which the employee's request
to modify the full-time face-time norm really does impose "significant difficulty
or expense," thereby rising to the level of undue hardship. In these cases, the
employer could keep its exclusionary workplace design. In situations where the
timing or location of performance really is integral to business operations,
however, employees may not bother bringing such cases in the first place.
388
When such cases are litigated, the ultimate result will be the same under the
transformative approach as it is under the current essentialist approach. Under
the former approach, the employer would raise a successful undue hardship
defense, while under the latter approach, the employee would fail to state a
prima facie case. Either way, the ADA would impose no obligation on the
employer to modify the full-time face-time norm.
384. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2004) (explaining that "an employer would not
be expected to accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware," and that "it is the responsibility
of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed").
385. EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 124
("[R]easonable accommodation only requires that the employer modify the policy for an
employee who requires such action because of a disability; therefore, the employer may
continue to apply the policy to all other employees."); see also Travis, The Virtual Workplace,
supra note 16, at 329-30 (explaining the difference between the remedies available in an
accommodation claim and a disparate impact claim).
386. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2000).
387. Cf Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 383 (describing accommodations as an
"investment" for which "[t]he employer incurs a possible loss at the point of accommodation but
reaps the benefit in the future").
388. See EEOC GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 231, 12 n.65
("[1]f the time during which an essential function is performed is integral to its successful
completion, then an employer may deny a request to modify an employee's schedule as an
undue hardship.").
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This similarity in outcome under either approach in this third set of cases
mitigates any concern raised by the fact that the transformative approach will
need to confront some situations in which the line between ajob "function" and
an "organizational practice regarding a function" indeed may be debatable.
While these two categories are largely discrete and typically easy to identify,
they may not be completely dichotomous. In some circumstances, an aspect of
the full-time face-time norm may be so central to performing the job's core
objective that an employer plausibly could characterize it as a "function." For
example, a television network might hire someone to be a "seat-filler" at the
Oscars, with the expectation that the person would be available to become a
"seat ornament[]" whenever a movie star takes a trip to the restroom while the
awards show is being televised.38 9 In this unusual situation, there is a plausible
argument either that accommodating the person by changing the time or
location of performance would be an undue hardship or that the inflexible face-
time requirement is indeed an essential function of the job. The result of either
argument, however, would be to allow the employer to retain its rigid face-time
rule. Under the former characterization, the employer would succeed on an
affirmative defense, although under the latter characterization, the employee
would fail to state a prima facie case. Thus the existence of difficult line-
drawing cases should not undermine the importance of shifting from the
essentialist to the transformative approach to interpreting the ADA. Situations
where the line is difficult to discern between a "function" and an
"organizational practice regarding a function" will be, by definition, the
situations most likely to fall into the third set of cases in which the employer
will have the easiest time stating an undue hardship defense, meaning that the
ultimate outcome would be the same under either interpretive approach.
Moreover, the number of difficult line drawing cases will be small to begin
with, relative to the number of cases in which "functions" are easily
distinguishable from "organizational practices." Any difficulty in dealing with
difficult line-drawing issues is therefore outweighed by the benefits of shifting
from the essentialist to the transformative approach to interpreting the ADA. A
primary benefit of the transformative approach is that it will reveal the very
existence of the first two sets of cases, in which the essentialist approach has
shielded from antidiscrimination review an entire array of exclusionary
workplace structures for which there is no legitimate business need.
389. See Jocelyn S. Weiss, The Almost Glamorous Life of a 'Seat-Filler', at
http://www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/Movies/9903/1 8/oscar.seatfiller.ew/ (last visited Oct. 18,2004)
(describing the responsibilities of a "seat-filler" at the Academy Awards ceremony) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Thanks to Sean Driscoll for first identifying this
example.
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B. Redirecting Headwinds with Title VII
When an employer's default organizational structures disproportionately
exclude women with caregiving responsibilities, courts interpreting Title VII
have two possible approaches analogous to the two approaches to ADA
accommodation claims. Courts are not limited to the essentialist approach,
described above, in which judges treat the full-time face-time norm as part of
the work itself rather than as a "particular employment practice" for organizing
work performance, thereby defining away any cognizable target for a disparate
impact claim. The alternative approach would tap into Title VII's unrealized
transformative potential by rejecting any assumptions about the inherent nature
of the existing workplace design. Under this alternative approach, judges
would begin by distinguishing actual job tasks from malleable organizational
norms, and they would treat the latter as a particular choice of practice
regarding the former, rather than equating the two. As a result, a woman's
identification of an exclusionary organizational norm would be deemed a
proper challenge to a particular employment practice that is subject to disparate
impact review. The employer would be required to eliminate the exclusionary
workplace structure and replace it with a less discriminatory alternative, unless
the employer could defend the existing design as "job related" and "consistent
with business necessity."'3 90 Rather than shielding both necessary and
unnecessary default structures from antidiscrimination review, this approach
would require employers to confront their own use of workplace essentialism
and identify a business need in order to retain an exclusionary workplace norm.
This transformative approach is consistent with Title VII's overarching
objectives. Just as Congress enacted the ADA's employment provisions as one
part of a broad-based scheme for achieving economic self-sufficiency and
integrating disabled individuals into all aspects of civic life, Congress also
enacted Title VII as one part of the broad, reconstructionist, and integrationist
objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII's antidiscrimination
mandate reflects this broader project by making it unlawful to "limit"
employees "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [the individual's]
status as an employee."
3 9 1
Although the original version of Title VII did not say anything explicit
about the disparate impact theory of discrimination, the United States Supreme
390. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the employer's affirmative
defense to a disparate impact claim).
391. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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Court recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 392 that the disparate impact
theory was implicit in this statutory provision. 393  The Court held that an
employer's use of aptitude tests and a high school diploma requirement for
particular job applicants violated Title VII because it disproportionately
excluded members of minority groups from the workplace.394 The Court held
that Title VII's antidiscrimination mandate and Congress's goal of equal
opportunity demanded the removal of all "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment," whenever those barriers have a discriminatory effect
on an historically disadvantaged group.395 Although the Court was addressing
discrete tests and hiring criteria, the Court's language was not nearly so limited.
The Court spoke of removing all workplace "barriers" and "built-in
headwinds, 3 96 and the Court stated that the disparate impact theory would
apply not only to "tests," but to "procedures" and "practices" as well.397
Some scholars have questioned whether this broad language in Griggs
really did represent a transformative agenda, given the opinion's historic
context.3 98 The Supreme Court decided Griggs in 1971 when employers were
experimenting with strategies to avoid the full effects of the new
antidiscrimination rules imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Those strategies included the use of seniority systems and the adoption of
educational degree requirements and entrance exams. 399 Arguably, the Griggs
opinion was intended only as a response to these specific strategies, rather than
as an endorsement of a broadly transformative vision of Title VII. 400 Certainly,
the Supreme Court's original intent to use the disparate impact model as a tool
392. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
393. Id. at 431.
394. Id. at 436.
395. Id. at 431; see also id. at 426 n. 1, 429-30 (stating that the disparate impact model
should "remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor" one group over another).
396. Id. at 429-30, 432; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1987)
(reiterating that Title VII's basic promise was to "break down old patterns of segregation and
hierarchy"); Abrams, supra note 10, at 1196 (noting that the Court's mandate to use Title VII to
address the "'built-in headwinds' facing minority workers ... encouraged advocates to pursue
and to eradicate a variety of more subtle, and often more intransigent, forms of discrimination"
(quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432)).
397. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141, 143
(1977) (citing Griggs and applying the disparate impact model to an employer's "policy of
depriving employees returning from pregnancy leave of their accumulated seniority" and to an
employer's "policy of not awarding sick-leave pay to pregnant employees").
398. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, Remarks at the Law and
Society Association 2004 Annual Meeting (May 28, 2004).
399. Id.
400. Id.
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for redesigning basic workplace structures is less evident than Congress's
transformative intent when enacting the ADA's accommodation mandate.
However, although the Griggs Court only applied the disparate impact theory to
the discrete hiring criteria at issue in the case, the Court chose not to articulate
particular limits to its ruling, instead casting the disparate impact model as a
tool for removing all types of "headwinds" and "barriers." At a minimum, this
language created the potential for using the disparate impact theory for large-
scale workplace restructuring, regardless of the Court's specific intent.40 '
Congress itself endorsed this potential in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the
1991 Act), which amended Title VII to codify explicitly the disparate impact
model that the Griggs Court already had recognized as implicit in Title VII's
more general provisions. 40 2 The specific provision that the 1991 Act added to
Title VII defined discrimination to include situations in which an employer
"uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," if the employer fails to
demonstrate that the practice is "job related" and "consistent with business
necessity. ,403 Congress directed courts to apply this new provision consistently
with Griggs.4°4 Thus courts are ignoring the transformative and integrationist
potential that Congress implicitly endorsed when courts interpret the "particular
employment practice" language to exclude structural and organizational aspects
of the workplace that act as "barriers" and "built-in-headwinds" for women with
caregiving responsibilities.4°5
401. The Supreme Court's broad application of the disparate impact theory in Watson v.
Fort Worth Nat'l Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), provides further support for viewing
Griggs as the endorsement of a deeply transformative tool, rather than as a narrow reaction to
employers' attempts to evade Title VII. In Watson, the Court not only held that the disparate
impact theory applies to "subjective or discretionary employment practices," but also allowed an
employee to challenge an employer's conventional, unstructured, and informal process for
making decisions. Id. at 982, 99 1. The Watson opinion thus reinforces at least the potential for
using the disparate impact theory to scrutinize wide-ranging aspects of the conventional
workplace design.
402. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-166, § 3,105 Stat. 1071,1071 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note) (stating that the purpose of the amendment was "to codify
the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated.., in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.").
403. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
404. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 note) ("No statements.other than the interpretive memorandum... shall be
considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history. .. .");
Interpretative Memorandum, 137 CONG. REc. 28,680 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of
reinstating Griggs); 137 CONG. REc. 28,878 (1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that the
1991 Amendment would "restore the law to its status under Griggs").
405. See also H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l) (1990), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
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This conclusion follows despite the fact that Griggs did not use the 1991
Act's adjective "particular" when describing the practices that should be subject
to disparate impact review. The 1991 Act did not codify the disparate impact
theory using the phrase "particular employment practice" in order to limit the
types of workplace structures that would be subject to disparate impact
challenge under Griggs, nor to exclude default organizational norms. The 1991
Act used the term "particular" to resolve a specific and highly divisive issue in
the 1989 Supreme Court opinion, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,40 6 the
case that was the immediate catalyst for amending Title VII. The issue was
whether an employee could state a prima facie disparate impact case solely by
identifying a statistical disparity between the percentage of the employer's
workforce that was made up of members of a protected category and the
percentage of that category in the relevant labor pool: the so-called "bottom
line" approach.4 °7 The Wards Cove opinion split five to four on this issue,
which was one of several aspects of the case that prompted Congress's rapid
response in the 1991 Act.
The five-person majority in Wards Cove held that a bottom-line statistical
disparity in an employer's workforce, by itself, could not sustain a disparate
impact claim because it did not establish the employer as a cause of the
disparate effects.40 ' The Court held that for an employer to be liable, "a
plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular
employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack., 40 9 The
term "particular" was intended to exclude the use of bare statistical comparisons
between the employer's workforce and the relevant labor pool, not to exclude
certain workplace practices from disparate impact review. The majority
emphasized that it was not changing the Supreme Court's analysis in prior
disparate impact cases that had "always focused on" the effects of identifiable
practices.410 In other words, the Court was not using the adjective "particular"
572-76 (noting the wide variety of working conditions that constitute practices subject to
disparate impact review); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 709
(defining "practices" broadly); cf Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 16, at 137
(explaining that Griggs "opened the door for a structural approach to combating discrimination"
by "recogniz[ing] the role that institutional choices ... can play in perpetuating stratification in
the workplace" and by "recognizing systems as legitimate subjects for legal regulation").
406. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
407. Id. at 656-58.
408. See id. at 675 (noting that there are "myriad innocent causes that may lead to
statistical imbalances" in the workplace).
409. Id. at 657.
410. Id. at 656.
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in an attempt to narrow the targets for disparate impact challenges post-Griggs,
but instead it was focused on evidentiary concerns regarding causation.41'
The four-person dissent in Wards Cove argued that a bottom-line
statistical disparity in an employer's workforce should sustain a prima facie
disparate impact case on its own.412 Significantly, the dissent did not view the
majority's use of the term "particular" as narrowing the types of employment
practices that could be reviewed under the disparate impact model but rather as
imposing an "additional proof requirement" on causation.413 The dissent was
concerned that employers often use "numerous questionable employment
practices" that "'combine to produce a single ultimate selection decision."'
41 4
The dissent feared that employers could shield themselves from disparate
impact challenges under the majority's view simply by basing decisions on a
combination of multiple factors, making it impossible for employees to identify
the effects of each individual element.415
The 1991 Act used the phrase "particular employment practice" to resolve
this dispute. This is evident when the phrase is read in the context of other
provisions that the 1991 Act added to Title VII, including the following:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established... only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the
complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
411. This is evident in the very broad range of so-called "particular" practices that the
Court identified in the facts before it, including using nepotism, using separate hiring channels
for different positions, providing rehire preferences, and using subjective decisionmaking to
select for certain positions. Id. at 657.
412. There were two dissenting opinions in the case, one written by Justice Blackmun and
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, and one written by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 661-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
662-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 672 n. 19, 673 (quoting the Solicitor General's Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 22).
415. See id. at 673 (stating that the majority decision "tip[s] the scales" in favor of
employers).
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respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment
416practice.
Subsection (B)(i) shows that Congress was grappling with how to resolve the
dispute over bottom-line statistics in Wards Cove and that Congress used the
term "particular" to clarify its resolution of that specific dispute. Moreover,
Congress elsewhere directed courts to interpret the disparate impact provisions
in accord with the Supreme Court's pre-Wards Cove decisions, including
Griggs.417 Accordingly, courts should not interpret the term "particular" to
undermine the disparate impact model's transformative potential, which is still
housed within the Griggs opinion.41 8
Courts in the European Union have been quicker than American courts to
recognize that using the disparate impact model to dismantle aspects of the full-
time face-time norm that fall disproportionately on women caregivers is a
logical application of Griggs. In a series of cases in the 1980s, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) held that treating part-time workers
less favorably than full-time workers with respect to hourly wage rates,
pensions, sick pay, and other benefits were practices subject to disparate impact
review.41 9 The ECJ held that marginalizing part-time work had a disparate
420impact on women, who made up the majority of the part-time workforce. In
416. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l) (2000).
417. See supra note 404 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress intended to
codify Griggs).
418. See also Charles A. Sullivan, Re-Reviving Disparate Impact (forthcoming 2005)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Nat 'l Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977 (1988), also supports a broad interpretation of the types of employment practices that
may qualify for disparate impact scrutiny under the 1991 Act) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
419. See Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd. [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 24 (E.C.J.)
(considering the practice of paying part-time workers an hourly wage rate that was 10% lower
than the rate for full-time workers); Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber Von Hartz & Co. [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 701 (E.C.J.) (discussing the exclusion of part-time workers from a supplementary
pension); Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaudereinigung GmbH & Co. [1993] 2 C.M.L.R.
932, 945 (E.C.J.) (discussing the exclusion of part-time workers from sick pay). In the
European Union, the disparate impact model is referred to as "indirect discrimination." Equal
Opportunities Commission Website for Legal Advisors: Is there an Indirect Sex or Marital
Discrimination Claim?, at http://www.eoc-law.org.uk/cseng/family-friendly-hours/l.is-there_
anindirect sex or martialdiscrimination claim.asp (last updated July 26, 2004) [hereinafter
EOC Website on Indirect Discrimination] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
420. See Jenkins, [1981] 2 C.M. L.R. at 42 (ruling that distinguishing between full-time and
part-time workers may discriminate against women); Bilka-Kaufhaus, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at
722-23 (same); Rinner-Kuhn, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 946 (same).
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the two most influential of these cases, the Advocate General cited Griggs to
421support this position.
Courts in the United Kingdom have taken this reasoning one step further
by applying the disparate impact model to an employer's failure to provide part-
time or other flexible work arrangements in the first place. The United
Kingdom's Equal Opportunities Commission Website for Legal Advisors
(EOC Website) cites the relevant case law and reports that "[a] refusal to allow
a woman to do flexible working" may be the basis for a disparate impact
claim.422 The EOC Website explains that these claims may arise, for example,
when a woman wants to return from maternity leave on a reduced or flexible
hour schedule or when an employer advertises a job as full-time only.
423
According to the EOC, "the fact that it is mainly women who have primary
responsibility for childcare makes it more difficult for them to work long hours,
overtime, and irregular hours," which means that such practices will be deemed
discriminatory "[u]nless such hours can be justified by the needs of the
business.,
424
In reaching this conclusion, courts in the United Kingdom had no
difficulty characterizing the full-time face-time norm as a practice that is
subject to disparate impact review. The EOC Website explains that such
practices include a wide range of default organizational structures, including
"the refusal to allow flexible working to suit the employee's childcare, such as
job-share ... teleworking, [or] compressed hours," "a provision that employees
should be available to work their normal contractual hours without variation,"
"a requirement to work overtime," "a contractual obligation or a practice of
undertaking long hours," "a refusal to allow a woman to work from home," or
requirements "to work full-time, to work inflexible hours from 8:30 to 5:30...
or to work at the office every day. " 425 As a result, courts cannot dismiss these
types of disparate impact cases easily in the United Kingdom, and the central
issue typically becomes whether or not the employer can prove a business
justification for the default organizational norm.42 6
421. Jenkins, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 26, 35; Bilka-Kaujhaus, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 703,
712.
422. EOC Website on Indirect Discrimination, supra note 419.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Equal Opportunities Commission Website for Legal Advisors: The Four Elements of
Indirect Discrimination, at http://www.eoc-law.org.uk/cseng/familyfriendlyhours/3.the_
four elements-of indirectdiscrimination.asp (last updated July 21, 2004) (interpreting the
phrase "provision, criterion or practice" in U.K. law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
426. See id. (discussing business justification).
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Although many courts in the United States have failed to recognize that
such default workplace structures are mutable organizational "practices," rather
than fixed elements defining the job, that does not mean it is time to abandon
the disparate impact theory in this country as a tool for transforming the
workplace. Not only is there a renewed scholarly interest in developing
disparate impact jurisprudence generally,427 but there are also several case
exemplars in this specific context in which a judge was both able and willing to
reach some of Title VII's untapped potential. In particular, a few courts have
taken Title VII's objectives seriously and recognized that the absence of an
employment policy-which equates to the selection of a particular alternative-
is indeed a "practice" subject to the disparate impact model. In Maganuco v.
Leyden Community High School,428 the Seventh Circuit addressed a claim
alleging that a school's prohibition on the use of paid sick leave back-to-back
with unpaid maternity leave, but not back-to-back with other types of leave,
disparately impacted pregnant teachers.429  Although the court affirmed
summary judgment for the employer due to a lack of evidence of any
disproportionate effect,430 the court acknowledged that the employer's default
preference for a worklife devoid of long interruptions was not necessarily a
fixed,, inevitable, and nonreviewable aspect of a job. "[A] policy which does
not provide adequate leave to accommodate the period of disability associated
with pregnancy," stated the court, "[could be] vulnerable under a disparate-
impact theory of liability under Title VII." 431 Perhaps this recognition was
made easier by the fact that the case could be dismissed on other grounds, but it
nevertheless lays the foundation for workplace transformation in the future.
The D.C. Circuit similarly laid such a foundation over two decades ago in
Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union432 when the court refused to
427. See, e.g., L. Camille H6bert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does
Motive Matter?, 53 KAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (conceptualizing some sexual harassment
cases as disparate impact claims) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Elaine W.
Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs Still Good
For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (arguing that "Griggs and the disparate
impact theory of litigation remain largely untapped resources of enormous potential for
plaintiffs"). See generally Sullivan, supra note 418 (compiling examples of the renewed
scholarly interest in the disparate impact theory and arguing that the future of the
antidiscrimination project should focus on reviving disparate impact claims).
428. Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991).
429. Id. at 443-45.
430. Id at 444.
431. Id. at 445 (citing favorably Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), and Miller-Wohl v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont.
1981)).
432. Abraham, 660 F.2d at 811.
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dismiss a claim alleging that a union's lack of disability leave disparately
impacted women due to pregnancy.433 Because the union's contract with the
employer limited certain employees to ten days of sick leave and ten days of
vacation, the employer fired Laurie Abraham from her job as an administrative
assistant when she became pregnant and requested maternity leave.434 The
union defended the termination, arguing "that it had no policy allowing such
employees any amount of additional leave for any purpose. ' 435 The D.C.
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that it "clashes violently with the letter
as well as the spirit of Title VII. ' ' 436 "An employer can incur a Title VII
violation as much by lack of an adequate leave policy as by unequal application
of a policy it does have," held the court, "and it takes little imagination to see
that an omission may in particular circumstances be as invidious as positive
action. ,
43 7
Several lower courts have reached similar conclusions. In EEOC v.
Warshawsky & Co.,438 for example, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois granted the plaintiff summary judgment on a claim alleging that an
employer's failure to provide sick leave during the first year of employment
was a practice that disparately impacted women due to pregnancy.439 "[I]f an
employer denies adequate disability leave across the board," held the court,
"women will be disproportionately affected." 440 A state court in Montana
similarly held in Miller- Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry
44
that an employer's ban on leaves of absence for temporary disabilities during an
employee's first year was a practice subject to disparate impact review.
442
Because the "no-leave policy subjected pregnant women to job termination risk
433. Id. at 813,818-19.
434. Id. at 813, 819.
435. Id. at 818-19 (emphasis added).
436. Id. at 819.
437. Id. at 819 & n.66 (emphasis added) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (2004)); see also
Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 299, 306-08 (3d Cir. 1997) (McKee, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the court's holding that Title VII does not require an employer to grant
maternity leave or to reinstate an employee after maternity leave and suggesting that the
disparate impact theory may apply because "[p]regnancy and absence are not... analytically
distinct").
438. EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. I11. 1991).
439. Id. at 651-55.
440. Id. at 654.
441. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984),
vacated, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), reinstated, 744 P.2d 871, 874 (Mont. 1987).
442. Id. at 1244.
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on a basis not faced by men," the court held that it violated Title VII." 3 As in
the ADA context, such a transformative interpretation of the statutory language
is supported by the regulations, which suggest that aspects of the full-time face-
time norm, including the preference for an uninterrupted worklife, should be
treated as "practices" that are subject to disparate impact review. For example,
the regulations state that "an employment policy under which insufficient or no
leave is available" may violate the law by disproportionately excluding women,
if such a policy is "not justified by business necessity." 4"
The full import of the Maganuco, Abraham, Warshawsky, and Miller-
Wohl cases may have been overlooked because Congress enacted the Family
and Medical Leave Act, which now provides some employees with up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave to care for a newborn child, although that statute only
applies to employees after working for a year.445 The disparate impact analysis
in these cases, however, should still be a guide for current application of Title
VII.
At least one district court has followed the path of these decisions even
after the 1991 Act explicitly codified the disparate impact model into Title VII
443. Id. at 1244, 1252; see also Marafino v. St. Louis County Cir. Ct., 537 F. Supp. 206,
213 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (suggesting that an employer's "policy of refusing to hire those who
planned to take an early leave of absence" was a practice subject to disparate impact analysis,
but holding that the plaintiff failed to show that the practice disproportionately affected women),
aff'd, 707 F.2d 1005, 1006 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983).
444. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (2004). The EEOC's regulations for the ADA arguably are
inconsistent with the regulations on sex discrimination. In distinguishing the ADA's
accommodation mandate from the disparate impact model, the EEOC states:
[S]ome uniformly applied employment policies or practices, such as leave policies,
are not subject to challenge under the adverse impact theory. "No-leave" policies
(e.g., no leave during the first six months of employment) are likewise not subject
to challenge under the adverse impact theory. However, an employer, in spite of its
"no-leave" policy, may, in appropriate circumstances, have to consider the
provision of leave to an employee with a disability as a reasonable accommodation,
unless the provision of leave would impose an undue hardship.
Id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.1(b)&(c); see also EEOC MANUAL, supra note 231, at VII-10
(similarly distinguishing between the disparate impact and accommodation theories). It is
unclear why the EEOC would endorse treating a no-leave policy as a particular employment
practice that is subject to disparate impact review for sex-based effects under Title VII but not
for disability-based effects under the ADA. The point of the EEOC's ADA materials simply
may have been to highlight the fact that a disabled individual may bring an accommodation
claim based solely on the fact that such individual was excluded from the workplace, whereas a
disparate impact challenge would require evidence that disabled individuals as a group suffered
substantially greater exclusion than nondisabled individuals.
445. 29 U.S.C. §§ 261 l(2)(A)(i), 2612(a)(i) (2000); see also Nev. Dep't of Hum. Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737-40 (2003) (concluding that the FMLA is enforceable for money
damages against state employers and suggesting in dicta that Title VII could not be used to force
employers to provide employees with family leave).
RECAPTURING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL
using the "particular employment practice" phrase. In Roberts v. United States
Postmaster General,446 the Eastern District of Texas held that Shelly Roberts
stated a disparate impact claim challenging an employer's lack of sick leave to
care for family members." 7 Roberts alleged that "the failure of the defendant to
allow employees to take time off to care for children" had a disparate impact on
women because they were "forced to resign more often than men because of
their more frequent role as child-rearers." 44  The court characterized the
employer's refusal to allow employees to use sick leave to care for family
members as a "policy of denying parental leave," which was subject to
disparate impact review. 449 "While an employer can violate Title VII by
applying unequally a policy it does have," held the court, "an employer can also
violate Title VII by failing to provide an adequate policy-a policy which on its
face is neutral, but which has a disparate impact on women. "
450
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished between employee
"benefits" and employee "burdens," the latter of which is the proper focus of a
disparate impact claim. "Admittedly, [the] employees are provided with the
same benefits," explained the court, but the problem arises because "the
burdens of these benefits" are disparate.45' Specifically, "women are forced to
resign more often than men because of their more frequent role as child-
rearers."452  By refusing to essentialize the default requirement of an
uninterrupted worklife, the court was able to conclude that such unequal
burdens are "exactly th[e] type of harm that Title VII seeks to redress.v
4 53
Some courts have recognized this in other contexts as well,454 including
when an employer recruits via the word-of-mouth of incumbent employees.
Though some courts have characterized word-of-mouth hiring as the lack of a
particular practice, thereby shielding such an exclusionary hiring method from
446. Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
447. Id. at 287-89.
448. Id. at 289.
449. Id. at 287-88.
450. Id. at 289 (citing Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
451. Roberts, 947 F. Supp. at 289.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. See, e.g., DeClue v. Central Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436-37 (7th Cir. 2000)
(indicating that an employer's lack of restrooms could be a practice that disparately affects
women workers); Goicoechea v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 559, 560 (9th Cir.
1983) (assuming without deciding that an employer's requirement of extensive travel was a
"policy" subject to disparate impact review, but affirming summaryjudgment for the employer
on other grounds).
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a disparate impact challenge, other courts have recognized that informal word-
of-mouth hiring is just as much a particular practice as any formal hiring
method. In Thomas v. Washington County School Board,415 for example, the
Fourth Circuit cited Griggs and held that a school board's use of word-of-
mouth hiring was a practice that had a racially disparate impact in violation of
Title VII. 456 The court ordered the employer to replace its word-of-mouth
hiring practice with a practice of "publicly advertis[ing] vacancies," thereby
undoing one type of workplace barrier and headwind.457 In a similar case, the
Fourth Circuit was even more explicit in translating Title VII's transformative
objective into an affirmative obligation by holding that employers have a "duty
of insuring removal of all vestiges of discrimination."
45
One reason that courts may be hesitant to enforce this duty and apply the
disparate impact model to default organizational structures is a concern about
the financial or operational effects that this may have on employers. This is
particularly true because the remedy for a disparate impact claim can include
replacing the offending practice with a less discriminatory alternative practice
for all employees, not just modifying or making an exception to the practice for
the plaintiff, as occurs in an ADA accommodation case.459
However, Congress decided exactly how the effects on employers should
be assessed when it provided employers with an affirmative defense. That
defense allows an employer to retain an exclusionary practice when the
employer proves that the practice is "job related" and "consistent with business
necessity."460 When a plaintiff challenges the disparate effects of some aspect
of the full-time face-time norm, employers may use this defense to justify the
default organizational structure. This approach correctly places the burden on
the employer to demonstrate explicitly why the conventional workplace should
not be altered, rather than having courts implicitly assume the essential nature
of the workplace when deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a prima facie
case.4 6 1 Placing this burden on the employer will allow courts to distinguish
455. Thomas v. Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1990).
456. Id. at 923-26 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
457. Id. at 926.
458. See Barnett v. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549, 550 (4th Cir. 1975) (concluding that
recruitment of drivers from walk-in applicants or "word of mouth" of incumbent drivers was a
practice subject to disparate impact review under Title VII).
459. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (distinguishing the remedies in disparate
impact and accommodation claims).
460. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
461. See EEOC v. Warchawsky& Co., 768 F. Supp. 647,655 (N.D. 111. 1991) (stating that
the "[m]ere recitation of a policy's necessity is not sufficient" to meet this burden).
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jobs in which default organizational structures really are dictated by business
needs from jobs in which mere convenience or historical tenacity are dictating
the default scheme.462
In addition, as in the ADA context, the result of the expanded scrutiny
under the transformative approach to Title VII is likely to reveal three different
sets of cases, not all of which raise financial or operational concerns. First,
there will be cases in which substituting a less exclusionary practice for the full-
time face-time norm would not have any negative impact on the employer or
may even produce positive economic results. The documented benefits that
flexible work arrangements can have on recruiting, retention, absenteeism, and
productivity 463 should be even greater when the workplace is redesigned
generally, rather than just making exceptions to the conventional design as is
done under the ADA. In this set of cases, the transformative approach would
force employers to recognize their reliance on workplace essentialism, rather
than reinforcing employers' essentialist vision by shielding default workplace
structures from antidiscrimination review. Cost concerns are misplaced with
respect to this set of cases, in which the transformative approach merely would
be forcing employers to move away from rationalizing the existing workplace
design toward designing a more rational alternative.
Second, there will be cases in which substituting a less exclusionary
practice for the full-time face-time norm would impose on the employer some
negative impact, financial or otherwise, at least in the short-term. If the
employer cannot defend the exclusionary practice as "job related" and
"consistent with business necessity," the employer would be required to
redesign the workplace under the transformative interpretation of Title VII,
whereas courts using the essentialist approach would impose no such obligation
by treating default norms as untouchable non-practices. In some of these cases,
cost concerns similarly are misplaced if the short-term costs are offset by long-
term gains from restructuring to adapt to a larger labor pool.464 If no such offset
462. Compare id. at 655 (granting the plaintiff summaryjudgment on a claim alleging that
the employer's failure to provide sick leave during an employee's first year disparately impacted
women and concluding that the employer failed to create a triable issue on the business
necessity defense) with Marafino v. St. Louis County Cir. Ct., 537 F. Supp. 206,214 (E.D. Mo.
1982) (dismissing a disparate impact case alleging that an employer's practice of refusing to hire
employees who planned to take an early leave of absence disparately impacted women in part
because the employer proved a business necessity for the particular attorney position at issue),
aff'd, 707 F.2d 1005, 1006 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983).
463. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (compiling evidence of the cost-
effectiveness of flexible work arrangements).
464. See Green, Workplace Context, supra note 16, at 672-73 (describing the long-term
economic benefits of reducing workplace discrimination); Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra
note 16, at 362-63 (arguing that courts should consider long-term effects when assessing Title
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exists, then the transformative approach could impose additional costs on
employers in this second set of cases. However, Congress and the courts have
rejected a simple cost defense to Title VII and have recognized that employers
must bear some expense to create equal employment opportunities.465
Moreover, other limits built in to the disparate impact model should mitigate
cost concerns. Perhaps most significant is that an employer only will need to
come forward with a business justification for a default structure if a plaintiff
can prove disproportionate effects, which is not an easy burden. Employers
need not search proactively for and experiment with alternative organizational
norms but only need to respond to alternative practices proposed by employees.
Additionally, employers do not face the threat of punitive damages in disparate
466impact claims.
There also may exist a third set of cases in which the full-time face-time
norm is so necessary to the business that the employer will be able to state an
affirmative defense and keep its exclusionary workplace design. In these
situations, employees may not bother bringing a claim, and even if they do, the
ultimate result will be the same under the transformative approach to Title VII
as it is under the current essentialist approach. Under the former approach, the
employer would raise a successful defense that the norm is "job related" and
"consistent with business necessity"; although under the latter approach, the
employee would fail to state a prima facie case. Either way, Title VII would
impose no obligation on the employer to modify the full-time face-time norm.
As in the ADA context, this similarity in outcome in the third set of cases
reduces any concern raised by the fact that the transformative approach will
need to confront some situations in which the line between work tasks and
organizational practices regarding work tasks may be debatable. By definition,
those situations will fall in the third set of cases where the employer will have
the easiest time stating a business necessity defense, which means that the
employer correctly will win under either interpretive approach. The existence
of this line-drawing issue therefore does not outweigh the benefit that shifting
from the essentialist to the transformative approach will produce by bringing
VII claims); see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 374-84 (explaining how the "'Me,
Inc."' culture-"in which workers are increasingly independent, short-term employment
relationships predominate, collective action is all but absent, and employer reliance on
contingent labor had dramatically expanded"-makes it difficult "to invest in the long-term
productivity of individual workers" through accommodations).
465. See Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 370,371 & n.454 (citing cases
that interpret legislative intent to reject a cost-based defense to discrimination claims).
466. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(a)(1) (2000).
RECAPTURING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL
the first two sets of cases within the reach of Title VII and forcing employers to
redesign exclusionary workplace structures that are lacking in business need.
The fact that some courts have been willing to apply the disparate impact
model to the full-time face-time norm despite cost concerns should encourage
the continued pursuit of disparate impact claims as a tool for restructuring the
workplace. Of course, this strategy may risk essentializing and thereby
retrenching women's caregiving role because the success of the disparate
impact theory depends on the fact that women perform the majority of
carework. 4 67 However, this risk is tempered by the broad-based remedy that is
available for disparate impact claims. When women successfully challenge an
employment practice using the disparate impact model, the court may require
the employer to modify or eliminate the offending practice altogether, which
would allow male workers who have or want to have significant caregiving
responsibilities to benefit from the workplace restructuring as well." 8 Thus,
correcting courts' mischaracterization of default organizational structures as
non-practices would be a significant step toward recapturing Title VII's full
transformative potential.
V. Conclusion
Employment discrimination law will never be the complete answer to
achieving workplace equality and economic self-sufficiency for women,
individuals with disabilities, or others who fall outside of the majority norms
around which the conventional workplace has been built. Nevertheless,
employment discrimination law remains an important and evolving tool for this
endeavor, in part because of the enduring resonance of its equal opportunity
469message.
467. See Travis, The Virtual Workplace, supra note 16, at 325, 330 (noting that although
there may be a "short-term risk of reinforcing gender stereotypes by characterizing work/family
conflicts as discrimination against women, the disparate impact theory provides the long-term
potential for creating a workplace that facilitates a blurring of traditional gender roles").
468. Id. at 329-3 1.
469. See id. at 320-21 (noting that one benefit of antidiscrimination law is "the power with
which equal opportunity rhetoric resonates with the American public"); Joan Williams, Do
Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. IssUEs 279,
316-17 (1998) (arguing that "equality rhetoric (and discrimination claims, which are really
claims of equality withheld), are the strongest weapons Americans [sic] feminists have in a
culture deeply committed to a self-image of equality"); see also Dowd, supra note 15, at 154-55
(noting that a benefit of using antidiscrimination law in the work/family context is that it "takes
advantage of an existing set of ideas and legal categories that retain great power and persuasive
capacity").
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Lifting the lens of workplace essentialism would allow courts to go even
further in achieving equal opportunity by allowing the ADA and Title VII to
restructure the conventional design. With the lens of workplace essentialism
removed, courts no longer will be able to treat exclusionary default structures as
"essential job functions" that disqualify individuals with disabilities from the
ADA's protected class. Courts no longer will be able to treat exclusionary
aspects of the full-time face-time norm as non-practices that are shielded from
disparate impact challenges under Title VII. And courts no longer will be able
to dismiss challenges to exclusionary organizational norms at an early motion
stage. Instead, courts will be forced to parse out the nonessential, malleable
ways in which job tasks are organized from the actual tasks that comprise the
essence of the job itself. As a result, employers will be pushed to confront their
own reliance on workplace essentialism as they try to defend the conventional
workplace design under the ADA's "undue hardship" or Title VII's "business
necessity" defenses. When employers take on this justification burden, they
may discover that the business need for the full-time face-time norm is, in many
circumstances, less than they assumed under the inertia of an essentialist view.
Interpreting the ADA and Title VII consistently with their transformative
objectives and potential is thus a necessary step to break the capture cycle
under which courts allow entrenched social norms to constrain their
interpretation of employment discrimination laws, and that interpretation, in
turn, entrenches the social norms even deeper. As Harry Chapin's song
recognizes with such simplicity, flowers are not just red, and green leaves are
not just green. In painting the picture of the essential workplace, it is indeed
"the time for art"-the time to see our workplaces in ways other than "the way
they always have been seen.
470
470. CHAPIN, supra note 1.
